Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2006

James Lewis Kimball v. Merae Kimball : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Wendy J. Lems; Lems Law Office PC; Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant.
Thomas R. Blonquist; Attorney for Respondent/Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Kimball v. Kimball, No. 2006263 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2006).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/6216

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

MC7
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JAMES LEWIS KIMBALL,

;)

ADDENDUM TO BRIEF OF APPELLEE
and CROSS-APPELLANT

Petitioner/Appellant, ]
V.

)

Appellate Court No. 20060263-CA

MERAE KIMBALL,
)
Respondent/Appellee
and Cross-Appellant. ]

MERAE P. KIMBALL,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Trial Court No. 024901659DA

;
]

v.

])

Appellate Court No. 20070858

JAMES L. KIMBALL,

;)

Trial Court No. 030902885

Appellant/Defendant. ]

CONSOLIDATED CASES
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY.
JUDGE JOSEPH C. FRATTO, JR.

Wendy J. Lems #7409
LEMS LAW OFFICE, P.C.
7050 South Union Park Center, Suite 350
Midvale, Utah 84047
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant
and Defendant/Appellant

Thomas R. Blonquist #0369
40 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Attorney for Respondent/Appellee
and Cross-Appellant and Plaintiff/
Appellee, Merae Kimball

\iii

)URTS

I N T H E U l A H r i M l k l (-h AI'FLAI S

JAMES LEWIS KIMBALL,

)

ADDENDUM TO BRIEF OF APPELLEE
and CROSS-APPELLANT

Petitioner/Appellant, )
v.
)

Appellate Court No. 20060263-CA

MERAE KIMBALL,
Trial Court No. 024901659DA
Respondent/Appellee
and Cross-Appellant. )

MERAE P. KIMBALL,

)

Plaintiff/Appellee,

JAMES L. KIMBALL,
A|)|>i , ll;iiii/hi. , !t. , iui;nil

APPEAL FROM 'I,,,

)
)

Appellate Court No. 20070858

)

Trial Court No. 030902885

)

CONSOLIDATED CASES
THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FUR SAl. I LAKJ< < 'ni 11JI \
JUDGE JOSEPH C. FRATTO, JR.

Wendy J. Lems #7409
LEMS LAW OFFICE, P.C.
7050 South Union Park Center, Suil.1 ISO
Midvale, Utah 84047
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant
and Defendant/Appellant

Thomas R. Blonquist #0369
40 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Attorney for Respondent!Appellee
and Cross-Appellant and Plaintiff/
Appellee, Merae Kimball

ADDENDUM

Divorce Case:
A. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
B. Amended Decree of Divorce
C. Ruling Hearing
D. Minute Entry
E. Order Re: Custody and Related Matters
F. Memorandum in support of Rule 60 (B) motion
Fraud Case:
G. Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law
H. Judgment
I. Amended Judgment

ADDENDUM "A"

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District
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Thomas R. Blonquist, (0369)
Attorney for Respondent
40 South Sixth East
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Telephone: (801) 533-0525

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JAMES LEWIS KIMBALL,

)

Petitioner,

FINDINGS OF FACT and
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

)

v.

)

MERAE KIMBALL,

)

Civil No. 024901659 DA

)

Judge Joseph C. Fratto, Jr.
Commissioner Susan C. Bradford

Respondent,

The above entitled matter came on for trial before the Honorable Joseph C. Fratto, Jr.,
District Court Judge, sitting without a jury, on November 30, 2004, December 2nd, 3 rd , 6th, 7th, 8th,
10th and 14th, 2004, and April 13th, 14th and 15th, 2005. Respondent was present represented by
her attorney of record, Thomas R. Blonquist, and the Petitioner was present with his attorney of
record, Wendy J. Lems. The guardian ad litem did not participate in the trial because custody
matters were not at issue. After hearing the testimony presented by the parties, reviewing the
exhibits that were received in evidence and considering the statements and arguments of counsel

and memoranda submitted and otherwise being folly advised in the premises and good cause
appearing therefor, the Court now makes and enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The parties were married each to the other on February 11, 1987.
2. Petitioner filed a complaint for divorce on March 18, 2002.
3. The parties' marriage was dissolved by a decree of divorce dated August 7, 2003,
reserving for trial the custody and financial issues.
4. The custody issues were resolved by stipulation approved by the Court and set forth in
an order dated March 10, 2005, entitled Order Re: Custody and Related Matters.
5. The bench trial involved issues related to Petitioner's claims for one half of the
Respondent's inheritance, enhancement of Respondent's inheritance, attorney's fees and other
matters.
6. On or about June 22, 1988, Respondent received 913 shares of Utah Bearing and
Fabrication, Inc., a Utah corporation founded by her father, Frank Pardoe, the "Family Business"
herein.
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7. Respondent's father died on August 9, 1993, and under the terms of agreements
between Respondent, her mother, her brothers and her sister, she received 1,005 shares of stock
in the Family Business.
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8. On or about March 24, 1995, after negotiations with the then management of the
Family Business concluded, Respondent agreed to sell her 1,005 shares for $2,500,000.
9. Respondent received a down payment of $500,000 during March of 1995, and a ten
year trust deed note for $2,000,000 payable at the rate of $25,335.15 per month.
10. Respondent received the monthly payments through the month of June 1997, and on
July 1,1997, received $1,697,039.70, the balance owed to her under the trust deed note.
11. It is reasonable that all funds received by the Respondent from the sale of her shares
of the Family Business be characterized as an inheritance.
12. Respondent's practice was to deposit the monthly payment in her individual account
at Zions Bank, deducting a portion for her use.
13. Respondent opened an account at Fidelity Investments, the "Fidelity Account"
herein, on February 26, 1996, as an individual account, with Respondent's social security number
as the only tax identification number.
14. With a portion of the funds Respondent received from the sale of her stock in the
Family Business, she purchased treasury bills, issued in her name only, which totaled $224,000.
15. Every action on Respondent's part thereafter shows that her inheritance was her sole
and separate property.
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16. On occasion, in 1996 and 1997, the trust deed monthly payment was deposited in the
parties' joint account and checks were subsequently written by Respondent to the Fidelity
Account.
17. A SeaRay boat was purchased in June of 1996 for $34,000.
18. The entire purchase price was paid by the Respondent from funds in the Fidelity
Account.
19. When the boat was destroyed, the $30,000 insurance check was deposited in the
Fidelity Account.
20. The boat that was destroyed was replaced by the boat purchased in May of 2001 for
$35,805.72, the "Replacement Boat" herein.
21. The entire purchase price was paid by the Respondent from funds in the Fidelity
Account.
22. The parties invested at least $55,000 with Jay Rice, the "Jay Rice Account" herein,
during the year 2000.
23. The entire investment was paid by the Respondent from funds in the Fidelity
Account.
24. Substantially all funds were withdrawn from the Jay Rice Account by Petitioner.

4

25. Petitioner did not disclose to Respondent that he had taken substantially all funds out
of the Jay Rice Account.
26. During 2001, Petitioner told Mr. Rice that Respondent did not know that he had
withdrawn funds from the Jay Rice Account and to stall discussing the account with her until he
could borrow money to replace the funds.
27 Petitioner did not replace the funds he withdrew from the Jay Rice Account
28. A 1997 Suburban automobile was purchased in October of 1999 for $28,570.94.
29. The entire purchase pricex>f the 1997 Suburban was paid by the Respondent from
funds in the Fidelity Account.
30. The parties were in an automobile accident that destroyed the said 1997 Suburban
beyond repair.
31. To replace said vehicle, the parties selected and agreed to purchase a used 1997
Suburban for $26,300 from Larry H. Miller, Bountiful Chrysler Jeep, the "Replacement
Suburban" herein.
32. Petitioner told Respondent that the entire purchase price of the Replacement
Suburban would be paid by insurance proceeds from the 1997 Suburban that had been destroyed.
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33. Without Respondent's knowledge or consent, Petitioner forged her name on a
$30,510.95 check drawn on the Fidelity Account and made payable to Larry H. Miller Bountiful
to pay for the Replacement Suburban.
34. Said check was returned by Fidelity Investments marked "signature does not match."
35. The insurance proceeds did not cover the entire purchase price of the Replacement
Suburban.
36. In order to pay the balance on the Replacement Suburban after the insurance
proceeds were applied, Petitioner applied for a loan from Zions Bank.
37. Petitioner completed and signed a credit application on December 26, 2000, stating
that he earned $60,000 per month.
38. Petitioner did not inform Respondent that he borrowed $12,555.95 from Zions Bank
to purchase the Replacement Suburban.
39. Petitioner did not inform Respondent that he wrote checks payable to Zions Bank to
make payments on the Replacement Suburban loan by forging Respondent's name on Fidelity
Account checks.
40. During September of 1997, the parties purchased a home on Lori Kay Drive,
Holladay, Utah, the "Lori Kay Home" herein, and a vacant lot hereinafter referred to as the "Odd
Piece of the Lori Kay Property", for $379,964.67.
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41. The entire purchase price was paid by the Respondent from funds in the Fidelity
Account.
42. The Lori Kay Home was remodeled and the entire cost of remodeling was paid by the
Respondent from funds in the Fidelity Account.
43. The Lori Kay Home was sold in October of 1998 for $406,142.55 after real estate
commissions and closing costs were paid.
44. The Odd Piece of the Lori Kay Property was not sold and, at the time of trial, was
held jointly by the parties.
45. The net proceeds of the sale of the Lori Kay Home were deposited in the Fidelity
Account and every action taken thereafter shows that the funds were the Respondent's sole and
separate property.
46. Petitioner made no objection that the funds received from the sale of the Lori Kay
Home be placed back into the Fidelity Account nor did he make a claim on the said funds, in
fact, he assented that it was the Respondent's funds that had purchased and remodeled the Lori
Kay Home and that, when the Lori Kay Home was sold, Respondent was entitled to the proceeds.
47. It is reasonable that the funds received from the sale of the Lori Kay Home,
$406,142.55, be the Respondent's sole and separate property.
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48. The Respondent intended that her inheritance be handled separately, not as a marital
asset.
49. Every act of the Respondent manifested her intent that her inheritance be handled
separately.
50. Respondent's inheritance was placed in a separate account accessible through the
writing of checks by the Respondent only.
51. Respondent's inherited funds were placed in the Fidelity Account that was in the
Respondent's name at all times.
52. Respondent's inherited funds were not commingled either tn the way they were used
or by their deposit into joint accounts.
53. Joint accounts were used as conduits for Respondent's inherited funds, not as
repositories in which they became commingled.
54. To the extent that Respondent's inherited funds remained in a joint account, they
were commingled, but when they came out of the joint account they resumed their character as
Respondent's inherited funds and as such they became the sole and separate property of the
Respondent.
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55. To the extent that Respondent's inherited funds were placed in joint accounts, such
as the Jay Rice account, this was done as a convenience and did not have the legal, the factual or
the intended legal affect of either commingling the funds or making them marital property.
56. Petitioner did not enhance Respondent's inheritance.
57. No act of the Petitioner increased the amount of shares of the Family Business that
the Respondent received, caused Respondent's holdings in the Family Business to have a greater
value Gr resulted in the Respondent receiving a greater price for her holdings.
58. It is reasonable the Odd Piece of the Lori Kay Property, titled in the name of the
Petitioner and the Respondent as joint tenants, remain marital property.
59. It is reasonable that said Odd Piece of the Lori Kay Property be sold and the net
proceeds equally divided between the Petitioner and the Respondent.
60. Petitioner did not report any of the income earned in the Fidelity Account in his
1998, 1999, 2000 or 2001 tax returns.
61. Petitioner earned an adjusted gross income in the year 1998 of $2,391.
62. Petitioner earned an adjusted gross income in the year 1999 of minus $61.
63. Petitioner earned an adjusted gross income in the year 2000 of $600.
64. Petitioner earned an adjusted gross income in the year 2001 of $1,624.
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65. Petitioner misrepresented to Respondent his 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001 income and
failed to disclose collection actions and lawsuits filed against him.
66. When the parties separated in February and March of 2002, the amount remaining in
Respondent's Fidelity Account was $1,042,840.72.
67. Respondent withdrew $1,000,000 from the Fidelity Account in April of 2002, and the
balance was withdrawn in June of 2002.
68. Respondent filed an individual tax return for 1998 and reported all earnings, 564,927,
from the Fidelity Account.
69. The Village Point Way home is held jointly by Petitioner and Respondent, and, at the
time of trial, had a value of $205,000.
70. Respondent paid the balance owing on the Village Point Way home, $86,128.24, on
June 6, 1995, from her inheritance.
71. It is reasonable that Petitioner be granted a $102,500 equitable lien in the Village
Point Way home to be received by him when the youngest child reaches eighteen years of age or
graduates from high school, whichever occurs last.
72. Petitioner, without authorization, forged Respondent's name on Fidelity Account
checks totaling $142,467 made payable to himself or cash that he converted to cash.
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73. Petitioner did not inform Respondent what he did with the $142,467 nor did he give
her an accounting of his use of said funds, other than to state in court that the cash he received
was used for family purposes.
74. Petitioner did not substantiate his testimony by producing receipts, cancelled checks
or other documentation.
75. Petitioner, without authorization, altered 6 checks given to him by the Respondent by
increasing them from $ 1,000 to $4,000.
76. The alterations reduced Respondent's balance in the Fidelity Account $18,000 more
than Respondent intended when she wrote the checks and gave them to the Petitioner.
77. Petitioner has not given Respondent an accounting of his use of the said $18,000.
78. It is reasonable that the money so obtained by the Petitioner was used for family
purposes for the benefit of all members of the family, including the Petitioner.
79. Petitioner presently earns $2,900 per month.
80. Respondent graduated from the University of Utah with a Bachelor of Science degree
in Elementary Education.
81. It is reasonable that Respondent be imputed income of $2,900 per month.
82. It is reasonable that the Petitioner pay the Respondent child support based upon the
fact that he has physical custody of one child, Brooke, and that said child's primary residence is
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Petitioner's residence and earnings of $2,900 per month and Respondent has physical custody of
three children, Amanda, Ryker and Daniel, and said childrens' residence is Respondent's
residence and has imputed income of $2,900 per month, in the amount of $408 per month to be
paid, according to the split custody worksheet attached hereto as Exhibit A, until the youngest
child reaches eighteen years of age or graduates from high school, whichever occurs last, and that
each party take the tax exemption for the child or children in his or her custody and primary
residence as set forth at paragraph 2 of the Order Re: Custody and Related Matters entered in this
cause on March 10, 2005.
83. It is reasonable that Respondent not receive alimony from the Petitioner because she
does not have a need and he does not have the ability to pay.
84. It is reasonable that all personal property be awarded to the party who had possession
of that property at the time of trial.
85. It is reasonable that the Replacement Boat be sold and the net proceeds divided
equally between the parties.
86. There exists a debt for unpaid taxes for the years 2000, 2001 and 2002.
87. It is reasonable that the Respondent be solely responsible for the debt owed for
unpaid taxes based upon earnings received from the investment of funds she inherited.
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88. During the course of this litigation, the Court appointed as Special Master, Lisa
Reading, the custody evaluator, Dr. Matthew Davies, and the childrens' therapists, Jim Hottinger,
CSW and Dr. Haydee Mas, and it is reasonable that they be paid equally by the parties hereto.
89. In addition, it was ordered that the parties undergo psychological evaluations Petitioner to be evaluated by Dr. Phillip W. Esplin and the Respondent to be evaluated by Dr.
Donald Strassberg.
90. The fees charged by Court appointed experts were as follows:
Lisa Reading, Esq.

$7,000

Matthew Davies, Ph.D.

$11,355.57

James Hottinger, Ph.D.

$840

Haydee Mas, Ph.D.

$3,561

Phillip W. Esplin, Ph.D.

$3,300

Donald Strassberg, Ph.D.

$1,912.50

91. The parties paid the following amounts:
Respondent

Petitioner

Lisa Reading, Esq.

$1,500

$3,500

Matthew Davies, Ph.D.

$8,192.32

$5,074.75

James Hottinger, Ph.D.

$840

$0
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Haydee Mas, Ph.D.

$2,065

$1,062

Phillip W. Esplin, Ph.D.

$3,300

$0

Donald Strassberg, Ph.D.

$1,912.50

$0

Total

$17,809.82

$9,636.75

92. The Court appointed professionals have been paid in full except Lisa Reading, Esq
who is owed $2,000.
93. Based upon the disproportionate payments made by the parties to Court ordered
professionals, it is reasonable that Petitioner pay the Respondent $5,086.53.
94. It is reasonable that the Respondent pay the balance owed to Lisa Reading, Esq and
that she hold the Petitioner harmless therefrom.
95. It is reasonable that any balance owed at December 1, 2004, to others who provided
services for the parties in connection with this litigation, be paid by the Respondent and that she
be required to hold the Petitioner harmless therefrom.
96. It appears that there will be additional costs incurred by the parental coordinator, Dr.
Jill Sanders, and others and it is reasonable that the parties pay these expenses on an equal basis.
97. It is reasonable that to the extent there is a debt owing for unpaid taxes, the party who
owes the tax pay the debt and in the terms of joint debts, it is reasonable that if the debt is joint
but for the benefit of one party, then the debt be paid by that party.
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98. It is reasonable that the parties maintain health insurance for the use and benefit of
the children, if available through their employment, with each party to pay one-half of medical
expenses not covered by insurance.
99. If health insurance for the parties and their children is not available through
employment, it is reasonable that a policy of insurance be purchased with each party to pay onehalf of the monthly premium.
100. It appears that the Respondent failed to provide information about the childrens'
activities, removed the children from school, interfered with parent-time, changed the children's
enrollment, interfered with phone calls and prevented visitation that should have occurred.
101. Respondent knew of the order applicable to these matters, had the ability to comply
and willfully and knowingly refused to do so.
102. Consequently, it appears that Respondent is in contempt and because make-up
visitation is not possible in this situation, it is reasonable that Respondent purge her contempt by
paying Petitioner the sum of $3,500.
103. Petitioner has not prevailed on the main issues of this case which were his claims
for one-half of Respondent's inheritance and enhancement of Respondent's inheritance.
104. The attorney's fees that were charged by the Petitioner's counsel were neither
reasonable nor necessary and represent a situation where this matter got out of hand.
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105. The fees connected with the child custody and related matters have been paid,
consequently, there is no financial need to reimburse them.
106. It is not reasonable for the Petitioner to be awarded fees and costs because they were
neither reasonable nor necessary and because they were paid by others, specifically his parents.
107. It appears that the Petitioner's parents helped him pay the fees, that the fees are
already paid and that the Petitioner does not have to pay back those who helped him pay the fees.
From the foregoing findings of fact, the Court now makes and enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. All funds received by Respondent from the sale of her shares of the Family Business
should be characterized as an inheritance.
2. At no time did Respondent's inherited funds lose their character or identity.
3. Petitioner's claim for one-half of the funds received by the Respondent from the sale
of her stock in the Family Business should be denied.
4. Petitioner's claim that he should be awarded a portion of the Respondent's inheritance
because, through his efforts, Respondent received an increased amount of shares of the Family
Business and was paid more when she sold them, should be denied.
5. Respondent should be awarded as her sole and separate property all funds that were in
the Fidelity Account at the time of the parties' separation.
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6. All funds in the Jay Rice Account at the time of the parties' separation should be
awarded to the Respondent.
7. The Odd Piece of the Lori Kay Property should be sold and the net proceeds of the
sale divided equally between the parties.
8. Petitioner should receive a $102,500, non-interest bearing, equitable lien on the home
and real property located at 2087 Village Point Way, Sandy, Utah, payable when the youngest
child reaches eighteen years of age or graduates from high school, whichever occurs last, or when
the Respondent remarries or no longer utilizes said home and real property as her primary
residence.
9. Petitioner should not be punished in this proceeding for, without authorization, forging
Respondent's name on Fidelity Account checks and altering the amount of checks written by the
Respondent on the Fidelity Account.
10. Respondent should be imputed income of $2,900 per month.
11. Based upon Petitioner's present earnings of $2,900 per month and the Respondent's
imputed income of $2,900 per month and based upon the fact that Petitioner has the physical
custody and the primary residence of one child, Brooke, and the Respondent has the physical
custody and the primary residence of three children, Amanda, Ryker and Daniel, Petitioner

17

should pay the Respondent $408 per month as child support until the youngest child reaches
eighteen years of age or graduates from high school, whichever occurs last.
12. Each party should take the tax exemption for the child or children in his or her
custody and primary residence.
13. The Respondent should not receive alimony from the Petitioner.
14. All personal property should be awarded to the party who had possession thereof at
the time of trial.
15. The Replacement Boat should be sold and the net proceeds divided equally between
the parties.
16. Any debt for unpaid taxes for the years 2000, 2001 and 2002, should be paid by the
Respondent and she should hold the Petitioner harmless from said debt.
17. Respondent should be solely responsible for the debt owed for unpaid taxes based
upon earnings received from the investments of the funds she inherited.
18. Respondent should be ordered to pay the outstanding debt to Lisa Reading, Special
Master, in the sum of $2,000 and hold the Petitioner harmless therefrom.
19. Respondent should be awarded a judgment against the Petitioner in the sum of
$5,086.53 based upon his failure to pay 50% of the fees of professionals appointed by the Court
during the course of this litigation.
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20. The Respondent should pay any balance owed at December 1, 2004, to those who
provided services for the parties and their children in connection with this litigation and she
should hold the Petitioner harmless therefrom.
21. Any additional costs incurred by the parental coordinator, Dr. Jill Sanders, and
others, should be paid by the parties on an equal basis.
22. Any joint debts incurred by the parties during their marriage should be paid by the
party who received the benefit of that debt.
23. The parties should maintain health insurance for the use and benefit of their children,
if available through their employment, with each party to pay one-half of the premium and
medical expenses not covered by the insurance.
24. In the event health insurance for the parties and their children is not available through
employment, a policy of insurance should be purchased with each party to pay one-half of the
monthly premium and medical expenses not covered by the insurance.
25. The Respondent should be held in contempt of court for her failure to comply with
orders of this Court and be allowed to purge said contempt by paying the Petitioner the sum of
$3,500.
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26. The Petitioner's claim for an award of attorney's fees and costs should be denied.

DATED this

A

day of September, 2005
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Third Judicial District
SEP 2 0 2005
SALT LAKE

Thomas R. Blonquist, (0369)
Attorney for Respondent
40 South Sixth East
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Telephone: (801) 533-0525

ENTERED IN REQISTBY
' ' OEJUDGMENT.S
DATE

'^AGEO

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JAMES LEWIS KIMBALL,

•
Petitioner,

)

AMENDED DECREE OF DIVORCE

)

v.

)

MERAE KIMBALL,

)

Civil No. 024901659 DA

)

Judge Joseph C. Fratto, Jr.
Commissioner Susan C. Bradford

Respondent.

Having heretofore made and entered its finding of facts and conclusions of law, now, in
accordance therewith, and upon motion of the Respondent and good cause appearing therefor, it
is
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1. All funds received by the Respondent from the sale of her shares of the Family
Business, as described in the findings of fact, are characterized as an inheritance.
2. Petitioner is not entitled to any portion of the funds received by the Respondent from
the sale of her shares of the Family Business.
Amended Decree of Divorce @J

024901659

JD17455703
KIM BALL, J AMES LEWIS

_
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3. Respondent is awarded as her sole and separate property all funds that were in the
Fidelity Account, as described in the findings of fact, at the time of the parties' separation.
4. All funds remaining in the Jay Rice Account, as described in the findings of fact, are
awarded to the Respondent.
5. The Odd Piece of Lori Kay Property, as identified in the findings of fact, at the time of
the parties' separation, shall be sold and the net proceeds of the sale divided equally between the
parties.
6. Petitioner is hereby granted a $102,500, non-interest bearing, equitable lien on the
home and real property located at 2087 East Village Point Way, Sandy, Utah, to be paid when the
youngest child reaches eighteen years of age or graduates from high school, whichever occurs
last, or when the Respondent remarries or no longer utilizes said home and real property as her
primary residence.
7. Petitioner shall not be punished in this proceeding for, without authorization, forging
Respondent's name on Fidelity Account checks and altering the amount of checks written by the
Respondent on the said Fidelity Account.
8. Respondent is hereby imputed income of $2,900 per month.
9. Petitioner is ordered to pay Respondent the sum of $408 per month as and for child
support to continue until the youngest child reaches eighteen years of age or graduates from high
school, whichever occurs last.
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10. Each party shall be allowed the tax exemption for the child or children in his or her
custody and primary residence.
11. The Respondent shall not receive alimony from the Petitioner.
12. All personal property is hereby awarded to the party that has possession thereof at the
time of trial.
13. The Replacement Boat, as identified in the findings of fact, shall be sold and the net
proceeds divided equally between the parties.
14. Any debt for unpaid taxes for the years 2000, 2001 and 2002, shall be paid by the
Respondent and she shall hold the Petitioner harmless therefrom.
15. Respondent is solely responsible for any debt owed for unpaid taxes resulting from
earnings received from the investment of funds she inherited.
16. Respondent is ordered to pay the outstanding debt to Lisa Reading, Esq., in the sum
of $2,000 and hold the Petitioner harmless therefrom.
17. In addition to the debt owed to Lisa Reading, Esq., set forth above, the Respondent
shall pay the balance owed at December 1, 2004, to any persons who provided services for the
parties and their children in connection with this litigation and she shall hold the Petitioner
harmless therefrom.
18. Respondent is awarded judgment against the Petitioner in the sum of $5,086.53.
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19. Any additional costs incurred by the parental coordinator, Dr. Jill Sanders, and
others, shall be paid by the parties on an equal basis.
20. Any joint debts incurred by the parties during their marriage shall be paid by the
party who received the benefit of said debt.
21. The parties shall maintain health insurance for the use and benefit of their children, if
available through their employment, with each party to pay one-half of the premium and medical
expenses not covered by the insurance.
22. In the event health insurance for the parties and their children is not available through
employment, a policy of insurance shall be purchased with each party to pay one-half of the
monthly premium and the medical expenses not covered by the said insurance.
23. Respondent is hereby held in contempt of court for her failure to comply with orders
of this Court and she is allowed to purge said contempt by paying the Petitioner the sum of
$3,500.
24. Petitioner is not entitled to receive compensation from the Respondent in the form of
attorney's fees and costs.
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25. Each party shall sign any and all documents required to complete the distribution,
sale or transfer of property as ordered herein.
DATED this

it

day of September, 2005.
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-1IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ORIGINAL

JAMES LEWIS KIMBALL,
Petitioner,
vs .

Case No. 024901659

MERAE KIMBALL,

FILED DISTRICT COURT

Respondent.

Third Judicial District

)

JUN - 6 2005
-S^nLfcHreiH^l Hearing
Electronically Recorded on
May 24, 2005

SALT LAKE COUNTY

^

Deputy

BEFORE: THE HONORABLE JOSEPH FRATTO
Third District Court Judge

APPEARANCES
For the Petitioner:

Wendy J. Lems
LEMS LAW OFFICE
7090 South Union Park Avenue
Suite 540
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P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(Electronically recorded on May 24, 2005)

3

THE COURT: We have on the matter of Kimball vs.

4

Kimball.

5

needs to be here.

6

announce my decision on the issues presented by the trial that

7

was conducted.

8
9

The purpose —appears to me everyone is here that
The purpose for this hearing is for me to

The protocol for the hearing is that I'll tell you my
ruling, give you some of the reasons I make my ruling, make

10

some findings and so forth.

11

full findings.

12

here is to tell you why I ruled as I'm ruling.

13

I anticipate that probably have

Things will have to be added, but my effort

Let's begin with the main issue that was presented by

14

this trial.

15

from the sale of the stock in the family business.

16

note that in going through the record that there is an order

17

of April 10 th , 2003 in which the Court found that $340,000 was

18

clearly inherited money; but that $460,000 —

19

proceeds from the sale of the Lori Kay home —

20

The characterization and award of the proceeds
I would

that is, the
was in question.

Now, I don't know that that established the law of the

21

case.

22

that there is that order and that finding in that order.

23

I have not taken it as such; but I do make that note

I'm going to award the respondent the remaining funds

24

she now holds.

25

Fidelity —

These are the reasons.

That is, she holds from

from the Fidelity account, the Jay Rice account, if

-3any, and the sale of the Lori Kay property.
These are the reasons.
received as an inheritance.
be handled separately.

The funds initially were

The respondent intended that they

Every action manifested that intent;

and the money was handled separately.
It was placed in a separate account, accessible
through checks, if you will, the writing of checks.
remained in th-e respondent's name at all times.

Those

The funds

were not comingled either in the way they were used or in its
deposit into joint accounts.
The joint accounts were used as conduits for these
funds; not as repositories in which they became comingled.
Which the law of comingling is that they lose their character
and so forth.

'•

v

x

• •

I suppose to the extent that they remained in the
joint fund they might be characterized as comingled;' but they
came out of that account.

In coming out of that account, I

assume their character is what they were for what they were;
and that is inheritance proceeds that they're the sole and
separate party of the respondent.
To the extent that they were placed in joint accounts,
the Jay Rice account, or —

for example, or petitioner had the

ability to withdraw -•- that is, Mr. Kimball had the ability to
withdraw or to trade within the account, I find that this was
done as a convenience; and did not have either the legal, the
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factual or intended effect of characterizing the funds or

2

accomplishing of the char —

3

either comingling or making them marital property.

4

accomplishing the legal effect of

I find that the petitioner did not enhance this asset.

5

The asset, of course, is the stock in the first instance and

6

then the price of the stock and selling the stock in the second

7

instance.

8

brief replacement stock; but there is no evidence that his

9

efforts directly resulted in a greater price being paid, or

10
11

His efforts 1 find were to at best encourage seeking

that the stock had a greater value because of his efforts.
I find that the funds from the Lori Kay sale —

12

is, the $460,000 —

13

These are my reasons.

14

remodeling of the property were the respondent's.

15

based in joint tenancy.

16

that

is respondent's sole and separate property.
The funds used for the purchase, the

If it had remained property —

It wasn't

that is, (inaudible)

17

Lori Kay, and had not been taken out, then indeed it would have

18

been a marital asset, because it would then have properly been

19

characterized as using an inheritance to purchase an asset —

20

marital asset.

21

a

When it was sold the funds went back to the respondent

22

and every action taken certainly thereafter is that the funds

23

were hers.

24

back into her account, made no claim on the funds; and in fact

Petitioner made no objection that they be placed

25 I it appears to me that he acceded to the fact that these were

-5her funds that had purchased and remodeled the property; and
that on the sale she was entitled to the proceeds back.

To the

extent that the money was used to purchase property jointlyr
the property so purchased is marital property.
I find that the petitioner, without authorization,
signed the respondent's name to checks; and he without
authorization altered the amount on checks —
checks.

on certain

I find from a preponderance of the evidence that

the money so obtained was used for family purposes.
The only evidence that appears to be in front of me,
which was basically Mr. Kimball's testimony, is that those
funds were used for family purposes, seemingly interpreted
for the benefit of all the members of the family, including
Mr. Kimball.
I cannot draw —

I cannot reasonably draw from the

evidence the inference that the respondent wants me to draw
from the amount of —

the total amount that was obtained in

this way, or in the way it was drawn.
Consequently, the odd piece of Lori Kay property at
well, I r ll call it "the odd piece," is what I called it —

is

to be sold, because that still remains as marital property;
property purchased through the inheritance, but remaining as
such, has to be sold; and the net proceeds equally divided.
The marital property at Village Pointe, whose fair
market value appears to be $205,000, is awarded to the

—

-6respondent.

She is to assume, pay and hold whatever debt

—

I don't believe there is a debt on it, but whatever debt is
on that property; and to pay the taxes and fees and so forth
connected with that property.
I award the petitioner an equitable lien for one-half
of the $205,000, which is to be paid to him when the youngest
child reaches 18 years of age or graduates from high school,
whichever is last.
Now, let me go back here one moment in terms of these
unauthorized checks and the increasing the amount on checks.
I decline the respondent's invitation to award all the equity
in that home, the Village Pointe home, to her because of the
plaintiff's —

or the petitioner's altering of the checks.

I see this as a penalty which you're asking me to
impose; but if there had been evidence that I had seen to a
preponderance that the money taken in this manner, used in
this manner was used solely for his benefit, then I believe
the penalty that you suggest, Mr. Blonquist, would have been
appropriate.
Because I do not —

because I found otherwise in

terms of the evidence that was presented in front of me, and
I'm not drawing the inferences that you're suggesting from the
evidence, I see this ther becoming really just a penalty for
having altered checks and signed the respondent's name when he
was not authorized to do that.

-7I don't believe in these proceedings that such a
penalty would be appropriate.

I think I need to identify the

kind of property, how it was used and so forth, and make my
division and awards accordingly, and avoid punishments for bad
conduct.
I find that both the petitioner and the respondent
make $2,900 per month.
a matter of history.

The petitioner, I make this finding, as
Although he has had a history of making

more than $2,900 a month, and present earnings or at least at
the time the evidence was presented.
I make this finding in relation to the respondent as
a matter of imputation.

Temporary orders had a set income of

$892 and $893, which is minimum wage; but the evidence I had in
front of me was that —

and really the only evidence on this

point was that the respondent had in the past taught school.
I believe it was elementary school; and her testimony was that
in terms of what she was capable of earning, that it would be
something less than $35,000 per year.

So I've taken that

amount, divided it by 12, and that's $2,900 a month.
I find that each party has a need, if you will, for
$3,200 a month.

With those findings, I make these orders.

The

child support award is to take the number of the children and
so forth in the appropriate worksheet, with $2,900 per month
for each child —

I mean, for each party; and as a mathematical

computation and as a matter of the chart that would give you
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the amount resulting from the mathematical computation, that

2

will be the award of child support one to the other.

3 I

I'm not certain how that comes out, because you'll

4

have to —

5

draw those worksheets.

6

that's the award; and the child support is to be paid pursuant

7

to that certain award until the child reaches 18 years of age

8

or graduates from high school, whichever event occurs last.

9

at least in terms of current arrangements here,
In any event, however it comes out,

In terms of alimony, the standard for awarding alimony

10

is to evaluate the recipient's need, the payer's ability to

11

pay, and the recipient's ability to support themselves.

12

is the standard.

13

That

Petitioner, it appears to me, through work, and

14

respondent, with the sizeable assets, that have been —

15

she has and that have been awarded to her, are able to support

16

themselves.

17

appears to me, has an inability, if you will, to pay the

18

respondent alimony.

19

of alimony.

20

There is not the need.

that

Also, petitioner, it

Consequently, as I say, there is no award

In terms of the property, in terms of the personal

21

property, furniture, fixtures, appliances, so forth, that

22

property is awarded to the party which is in possession of

23

that property.

24

should pay, hold and hold the other party harmless therefrom.

25

Subject to any addendums thereon that they

In terms of debts, taxes that are owed, the party
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whose income is taxed must pay the tax and any penalties and

2

so forth associated with that.

3

joint returns where this applies; but it's the mathematical

4

computation in terms of the tax, the income, the tax and so

5

forth, and what taxes are owing.

6

There may have been some

So what I see here and what I'm ordering is that to

7

the extent that there's a debt regarding unpaid taxes, then the

8

party who owes the tax should pay the debt.

9

debts, if the debt is joint but for the benefit of one party,

10

In terms of joint

then the debt is to be paid by that party.

11

In terms of the debts that I saw were debts for the

12

children's therapy and so forth in that area, it appears to me

13

the respondent's in a better position to pay that debt, and is

14

ordered to pay those debts and discharge all other joint debts.

15

So if it's your debt, you have to pay it.

16

or a debt incurred for the children, respondent pays those

17

debt.

18

If it's a joint debt

In the caveat I would add to this is if there is an

19

order, not a temporary order, that modifies this —

20

one party was ordered to pay it —

21

my further determination, even though it may fall into some

22

category that the respondent is now required to pay, then that

23

order is the one to be followed.

24

That includes —

25 I no misunderstanding.

that is,

and it was not reserved for

now, let me add further so there's

Although in terms of the reviewing —

I
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hesitate here, because as I say, I tried to determine whether

2

there were other orders that were not considered temporary

3

orders, that might impact this, and I am not clear.

4

So that's why I'm adding that caveat; but I'm

5

including in this the debts for the special master, the

6

therapists for the children, and these sort of things.

7

Hereafter, the fees for the special master and coordinator

8

and the therapists for the children are to be paid equally by

9

both parties.

10

I'll tell you why I do that.

I think there's some

11

importance that each party participate in these —

12

process in terms of the children and in terms of the special

13

master and the coordinator, both as a check, if you will, one

14

on the other, in terms of the use of these things; and I think

15

there's some importance that there be a financial stake in

16

these matters to both parties.

17

in this

Insurance, health insurance for the children is what

18

I will deal with.

The petitioner and respondent are ordered

19

to maintain health insurance for the use and benefit of the

20

children, if available through any employment.

21

pay one-half of the uninsured.

22

employment, then a policy of insurance is to be purchased.

23

Each party is to pay half, and half of the uninsured.

Then each would

If it is not available through

24

In terms of contempt, the standard in terms of finding

25

contempt is that the parties must know what the duty imposed by

-li-

1

the Court, have the ability to comply with the order, and

2

willfully and knowingly refuse to comply.

3

the evidence fairly closely on this, and there's quite a bit.

4

I don't know if I'm going to be able to sort it out more

5

particularly than this, in terms of this hearing.

6

I have examined

I find that the respondent has been in contempt,

7

because she's failed to provide information about the

8

children's activities, removed the children from school,

9

interfe-ring with parent time, changed the children's school

10

enrollment, interfered with phone calls and prevented

11

visitation that should have occurred.

12

order.

13

knowingly refused to comply.

That she knew of the

She had the ability to comply; and she willfully and

Consequently I find the respondent is in contempt.

14
15

Make-up visitation which is anticipated, but I don't think

16

it's possible in this situation.

17

do anything in that regard.

18

petitioner as in the form of attorney's fees a sum of $3,500

19

for prosecuting the contempt and to purge the contempt.

20

So I'm not going to try to

However, respondent is to pay to

Finally, attorney's fees.

The standard in terms of

21

review —

22

on my part in terms of the award of attorney's fees.

23

a penalty; and I don't view it as such, and it is not viewed

24

as such a penalty that one should pay attorney1 s fees of the

25

others.

of awarding attorney's fees, this is discretionary
It is not
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If the fees are awarded, they must be based on the

2

spouse's financial need, the payer spouse's ability to pay,

3

and the reasonableness of the requested fees.

4

I think that's used often is "reasonable and necessary."

5

Another phrase

From the petitioner's side of it, on the main issue

6

he's not prevailed.

7

into account.

8

are reasonable and necessary.

9

I think I could and should take that

I'm also not convinced that all of the fees

We have $250,000 in fees in this case; and I've gone

10

through the accountings, and one cannot pick out, I suppose,

11

one particular entry or group of entries, and identify those

12

as unnec —

13

me that $250,000 in attorney's fees represents pretty well a

14

matter that got out of hand, and is not reasonable.

15

or not reasonable, not necessary.

It appears to

Also from the petitioner's side, it appears that the

16

fees connected with child custody and related matters have been

17

paid.

18

to reimburse those.

19

Consequently I don't see that there's a financial need

So it appears to me that the fact that the petitioner

20

did not prevail and was not the prevailing party on really what

21

was the main issue, and apparently so much devoted to that,

22

both in terms of —

23

here and so forth, did not prevail.

24

certainly in terms of what was presented

I can take that Into account, coupled with the other

25 I reasons, is not entitled to a fee; and because he's paid

—

-13already paid the fees.

Although I understand that these were

paid by others, is what it may have amounted to, and probably
did amount to it because of the size of the fees, I don't know
that he's legally bound to pay" back those debts in terms of the
fees.
Consequently I don't see where there's a —
need —

he has a

a legal need, as anticipated by our standard here, from

the respondent to help him pay the fees.

In other words, the

fee's already been paid; and I don't see that he legally has to
pay back those who helped him pay the fee.
From the respondent's side, she hasn't —

because of

the assets, that I can take that into account and should take
it into account, she has no financial need.

Petitioner,

appears to me, has no ability to pay it, in any event.
Are there any other issues that I have not addressed
in this determination?
MS. LEMS: A couple of them, Judge, on my notes.
THE COURT: Yes.
MS. LEMS: The award of the parties' vehicles, do you
want me to go through them one-by-one or just
THE COURT: Well, let me ask you this.
—

—
Was there any

what I intended when I said, "Each one in possession gets

what they have in possession," would that cover it; or is there
one —

is there a vehicle

—

MS. LEMS: Remember there's a boat that's supposedly

-14sitting somewhere at the respondent's mother's home.
THE COURT: Is that the boat that there was some
dispute as to who purchased it or bought it?
MR. BLONQUIST: I don't think there's any dispute about
that.

The money came out of the Fidelity account for the boat.

Remember there was a boat that was demolished in the accident?
THE COURT: I remember that, but is there another boat
—

I don't remember the witness.

Ms. Pardeaux's friend who was —

The friend, Ms. Kimball's

—

the question was whether a

boat had been purchased?
MR. BLONQUIST: No, that

—

THE COURT: That's not the boat you're talking

—

MR. BLONQUIST: The boat they have was the one that was
replaced when the insurance proceeds came in on the boat that
was —

and my client's had possession of that since the

—

well, it's at her mother's, but she has control of it.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. BLONQUIST: So I assume that that's what you meant.
MS. LEMS: Well, and the boat was certainly in dispute,
Judge, and you had several (inaudible).
THE COURT: No, when I made the —

no, and that's

covered I think by my ruling; but I just wanted to clarify,

because we had another boat in there that there was some
evidenc e pjresented.

I guess I don't remember Ms . Pardeaux's

friend who had testified that she had purchas ed the boat, and
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Ms. Pardeaux was really just storing for her.

2

MS. LEMS: So I'm clear, is the Court awarding the

3

respondent the boat?

4

THE COURT: No, no.

5

MS. LEMS: Oh.

6

THE COURT: —

Now I'm getting to the boat

—

now, which you apparently both agreed

7

which is the boat that was purchased; and I think that falls

8

under the category; and I intended that to fall into the

9

category of an asset purchased for the family by the proceeds

10

of the inheritance.

11

into that spot.

12

That appears to me where that boat falls

That was also the boat in which there was an altered

13

check connected with that boat.

Here again, it appears

14

to me that it has the character of a marital asset, because

15

although it was purchased with the inheritance money, it

16

remains as the boat for the family.

17

it's to be sold.

As such, a marital asset,

Proceeds are to be divided in half.

18

MS. LEMS: On the vehicles, Judge, just so I'm clear,

19

each party is awarded any vehicle that are currently in their

20

possession?

21

THE COURT: Yes, and all other property that —

22

pointed —

23

dispute.
J

24
25

the boat was an exception to that.

you

That was in

I don't know if there's anything else that fits into

r

that kind of category that we need to deal with.
MS. LEMS: I'm not aware of any right now, Judge.

-16THE COURT: But any property they have in their
possession is theirs subject to the debt —

to any debt.

MS. LEMS: Next is suer Judge, is tax exemptions, the
house, the Lori Kay lot, and the children.
THE COURT: Well, that Lori Kay lot, I think I've
disposed of, which is that it's to be sold because it again
is a marital asset.

It remains purchased by the inheritance

money; but purchased for the family, and we already disposed
of that.

I think it's that it's to be sold and —

I know there

may be some trouble doing that; but I don't know of any other
way to dispose of —

to resolve that, other than to order it

sold and divide it in half.
MS. LEMS: And in the interim of the sale, Judge, if we
have property taxes due, what would the Court's order be on
that?
THE COURT: Well, if it's marital assets, then they
should participate equally in any taxes and so forth, the fees,
and so forth that may be assessed on that property.
MS. LEMS: The minor children, the award of dependency
tax deduction?

If the Court could make a finding concerning

whether maybe one parent over another may not be filing a tax
return?
THE COURT: Let me ask you both in terms of the tax
exemption, and I know that had been raised, but let me retain
just for —

I've got an idea, but I haven't considered this.
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Let me consider it now, but let me first take it — have you

2

take really just a minute or two and suggest what you think

3

might be fair on that.

4

MS. LEMS: Would you like me to start, Judge?

5

THE COURT: Yes.

6

MS. LEMS: What I believe would be fair is in the event

7

one parent or the other is filing a tax return, and the other

8

parent is not, then of course the parent filing a tax return be

9

awarded all four minor children as dependency deductions.

10

In the event that the parties are both filing for tax

11

returns, presently Mr. Kimball has sole physical custody of

12

child Brooke.

13

custody of the three remaining children.

14

they're both filing tax returns, I believe it would be

15

reasonable that they be awarded the child currently in their

16

sole physical custody.

17

Presently the respondent has sole physical
Presuming that

The third option, Judge, which would be absolutely

18

equalizing and making it fair, is that they're awarded one-half

19

each of the children.

20

claimed as a dependency deduction.

21

Merae Kimball is awarded two, presuming that they're both

22

filing tax returns.

23

Currently we have four kids that can be
Mr. Kimball's awarded two.

MR. BLONQUIST: My client will, of course, be filing a

24

tax return; and I think that the suggestion made is that they

25

claim the child that they have physical custody of.

I would
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think that with Mr. Kimball's income, as it's been stated, if

2

he claimed his own deduction of that one child, he wouldn't

3

need any more.

4 I

THE COURT: Well, apparently this —

5 J agreement.

I see this as an

If you file a tax return, then you're entitled to

6

take the exemption for the child or children that you have the

7

physical custody of.

8
9

MR. BLONQUIST: Thank you, your Honor.

The one point

that I wanted to raise relative to the family home that my

10

client resides in, you'd mentioned the 50/50.

11

only reasonable with the Court's ruling, that Mr. Kimball be

12

required to pay 50 percent of all of the income —

13

real property taxes that my client has been —

14

year, including the delinquent taxes that were paid after he

15

left the home.

16

I think it's

or of the

had to pay each

We could get an accounting on that.

THE COURT: Well, I'm going to decline to do that.

17

The usual, and I see no reason to vary from this, given

18

the financial situation of either —

19

Ms. Pardeaux has the home, was given the —

20

that she pays all the taxes and fees associated with that home.

21

of both parties, that
awarded the home,

In terms of the arrearages, here again I think it's

22

mainly a matter of who's in a better financial position to pay

23

a debt incurred on joint property.

24

on joint property?

25

she does.

Who has the money to pay it

He doesn't have a greater obligation than

She has a better —

I agree to find that she has a
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greater financial ability.

So I'll have her pay it.

MS. LEMS: One last thing on my notes, if I may, Judge.

2
3

We had requested —

and at the time of argument, this well have

4

been our responsive, post-trial brief —

5

finding regarding the date of valuation at the time of the

6

parties' separation, rather than at the time the bifurcated

7

divorce.

that the Court make

Does the Court have a finding on that issue?

8

THE COURT: Tell me again, please.

9

MS. LEMS: We had requested that the Court make a

10

finding regarding the date for valuation of the parties'

11

marital estate at the time of the parties' separation.

12

Remember, Judge, they separated on or about latter part of

13

February, first part of March of 2002, versus the date of

14

valuation, which would have been at the time of the bifurcated

15

divorce.

16

That occurred, Judge, on August 8th of 2003.
THE COURT: What would be the need to make such a

17

finding, the way I've approached it and awarded the property?

18

Is there a need to make that kind of a finding?

19

MS. LEMS: I believe that there is, Judge; and I

20

believe it's for purposes of determining the debt (inaudible)

21

and asset values; and for purposes of any type of appeal that

22

either party may make.

23

THE COURT: Well, I'm not —

I don't know that I have

24

—

25

kind of asset evaluation; but I don't know that I need to make

you didn't present me with enough evidence in terms of that
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that finding in order to reach the conclusions that I reach. I

2

think that's the findings that I need to make, that support the

3

conclusions that I reached.

4

that.

I don't see that I need to do

5

Anything further?

6

MR. BLONQUIST: Yes, your Honor, one other item.

You

7

may have covered it, and excuse me if you have, but I don't

8

think that you have. When we settled the custody issue, we

9

reserved for your Honor an allocation of costs of our expert

10

witnesses; and I believe that that should be addressed.
We have set — provided to the Court by affidavit what

11
12

we have paid and what we still owe on those.

I think that it's

13

appropriate for your Honor to allocate whether each side should

14

total it and pay half, 50/50; or whether the party incurring

15

the debt should pay the debt.

16

it was something that was not resolved, and was specifically

17

referred -- reserved to your Honor.

I just raise that point because

Now, as I understand your ruling, you have mentioned

18
19

the special master's fees; and you've talked about therapists;

20

and you've talked about ongoing therapy that you think would be

21

beneficial to the family. Therefore, there would be a 50/50

22

split.

23

I believe that none of those categories 1bouch the

24

issue of — - well, for example, the cus tody evaluator is

25

separate

That was something directly related to the child
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custody issue.

2

appropriate that you address each of the costs of each of the

3

experts that were identified in the witness lists.

4

suggest that that be a matter that be divided 50/50 between the

5

parties.

6

There was a fee to —

well, I think it's

I would

I r ll submit it.
THE COURT: Thank you.

Ms. Lemsr do you want to

7

wish to comment about that?

8

say anything, but I have considered that and —

9 I costs of litigation.

—

I might indicate that I didn't

Go ahead —

let me

in terms of the

—

10

MS. LEMS: If I may, Judge.

11

THE COURT: Yes.

12

MS. LEMS: My concern would be, as we indicated in

13

our memorandum in response to the respondent's affidavit of

14

attorney's fees and costs, it appears that the respondent had

15

at least four different non-Court appointed experts lined up.

16

Off the top of my head, Judge, and please don't

17

quote me on it, because I don't remember what it was; but I

18

believe she had expert fees totaling well over 30 to $40,000.

19

As indicated in our responsive brief, I believe it's very

20

unreasonable that Mr. Kimball have to bear any of the burden

21

of the respondent's non-Court appointed experts.

22

Mr. Kimball, as the Court notes from his own affidavit

23

of attorney's fees and costs, had incurred his own rebuttal

24

expert, Dr. Donna Strassberg. We had requested in our affidavit

25

of attorney's fees and costs that Ms. Kimball pay one-half of

-22his fees.

He certainly was a whole lot less than the 30 to

$40,000 for her four other non-Court appointed experts.
THE COURT: May I ask this question.

In terms of what

might fit into the category of "Court appointed experts," the
custody evaluator would fit into that category.

I don't know

if there's any others here that would fit into that category.
Is there?
MS. LEMS: I believe maybe Jill —

Dr. Jill Sanders,

who was appointed by this Court, if you remember, Judge, by
stipulation of the parties, as a special master, as and for
the best interests of the children.
What I understand from what was testified to, is that
the parties were paying one-half of the special master fees.
Your findings today reflect that.

However, the Court hasn't

yet made findings on Dr. Davies.
If I recall the testimony, Judge —

and again please

don't quote me, because I don't have my notes on that

—

but I believe that Mr. Kimball had paid an extra $2,000 to
Dr. Davies.
THE COURT: Do you want to say anything further,
Mr. Blonquist?
MR. BLONQUIST: Well, just briefly, and here again, I
don't want you to quote me either, but I think if you look at
the accounting, we've paid more than half of Dr. Davies' fees;
and I think that in analyzing it, you're correct.

There is
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only one Court appointed custody —

2

or expert.

I think that it's fair that the parties equally share

3

that expense.

4

it; but if we've paid more than our share, then that should be

5

an adjustment.

6

If we've paid our half, then that takes care of

THE COURT: Was there any —

this also would fit into a

7

category, I think, of is there an order not anticipated to be a

8

temporary order or reserving the issue for the trial, that any

9

of these people, including the custody evaluator, that their

10

fees were to be paid by one party or the other?

11

MR. BLONQUIST: No, that is

12

THE COURT: That was either left up in the air or

13

—

reserved?

14

MR. BLONQUIST: It was reserved.

15

THE COURT: Reserved.

16

MR. BLONQUIST: It was reserved at the time of our

17
18

settlement of the issues related to custody.
MS. LEMS: If I may, Judge, on that question.

If

19

the Court were to look at the order regarding custody and

20

related matters as entered by this Court on or about March 10th

21

of this year, you reserved the issues of the costs of the

22

special master.

23

evaluator, Court appointed evaluation, including the costs for

24

any and all experts from both parties concerning the custody

25

portion of this matter are hereby reserved.

You reserved the issues concerning the custody
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THE COURT: Well, let me make this determination.

2

It would be my intention —

3 I it in some way here —

(inaudible) say I glossed over

is that the costs of litigation, which

4

included the expert fees and any depositions and any costs of

5

litigation are to be born by the party incurring those costs.

6

In terms of the custody evaluator, Court appointed
•

I

7

evalu —

8

equal share by the parties.

9

no misunderstanding.

10

Court appointed experts, those fees are to be paid in
Let me clarify again, so there's

In terms of the special master and the coordinator

11

and the therapists, I'm having Ms. Pardeaux, unless there's an

12

order, as I say, to the contrary —

13

if there's a dispute about that then we'll have to sort that

14

out —

15

these are Court appointed people, but —

16

I'm having her pay the fees up to this point.

17

it's to be divided in half.

18

do that.

apparently there isn't, but

but Ms. Pardeaux paying their fees.

So these are

—

to be certain, but
Then hereafter

I've given you the reasons why I

19

In terms of the custody evaluator, it seems to me that

20

that's also Court appointed, but for such an evaluation I think

21

it appropriate that the fee be divided in half and each pay

22

one-half.

23

That's how I'll decide it.
MR. BLONQUIST: Let me just say this, and we may have

24

to look into it, but from the time of the appointment of the

25

special master, which was Lisa Reading, each of the parties
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have been presented a bill.

We've each paid our half.

As far

2

as the parental coordinator is concerned, that's been the same

3

also.

We've received bills/ and each of the parties have paid

4

half.

So we're talking about Lisa Reading, and we're talking

5

about Jill Sanders.

6

THE COURT: Very well.

7

MS. LEMS: Whether the parties have paid one-half,

8

Judge, if you recall, that was the subject of many temporary

9

hearings.

In fact, the Court's file is awash with letters from

10

Dr. Davies, from Lisa Jones Reading and so forth that Merae

11

Kimball had not paid her one-half.

12

THE COURT: Well, and I'm not —

as I say, I'm giving

13

you a formula; and if there is an order that's a permanent

14

order that is otherwise, I'm going to state it again, then

15

that is the governing order.

16

Absent that, the special master, the coordinator,

17

the therapists, I'm having Ms. Pardeaux pay whatever is the

18

outstanding balance.

19

has the assets to be able to do that.

20

need to be paid.

21

incurred by and for both parties, and for the children for both

The reason I'm doing that is because she

They were —

Those are debts that

they're debts I think that are

22 I parties.
23
24

That's the —

a special master is not a special master

for the economic issues.

There's the children's issues.

These

25 I people need to be paid; and I'm looking to the party that's in
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the financial position to be able to pay these.

2

MR. BLONQUIST: As in what

—

3

THE COURT: And I think that's —

the reason I think

4

that's fair and appropriate and I think legally sound also is

5

that, as I say, these are debts for the children, and to assist

6

in terms of the children, and should be paid by —

7

out, one-half each; but there's been a debt incurred.

8

need to be paid, and respondent has the assets to do that.

9
10
11
12

13
• 14

from here on

MR. BLONQUIST: As of what date, your Honor?

Those

You said

if there's an outstanding balance owed, she's to pay it?
THE COURT: I'm willing to take it back.

I r m willing

to take it back to the time of the first day of trial.
MR. BLONQUIST: First day of trial?

Remember, that was

November.

15

THE COURT: Whatever date it is.

16

MR. BLONQUIST: Okay, I just

17

THE COURT: I think that's the

18

MR. BLONQUIST: I wanted to remind you that it was

19

November, not April.

20

order, I respect that.

—
—

If you have that in mind and that's your

21

THE COURT: The first day of trial.

Anything further?

22

MS. LEMS: No, thank you, your Honor.

23

THE COURT: Appreciate it.

24

MR. BLONQUIST: Thank you.

25

THE COURT: We'll be in recess.

I
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MR. BLONQUIST: All right.

2

THE COURT: Let me —

but let me resolve one other

3

thing.

That is the drawing of the findings and conclusions

4

and the decree.

5

agreed upon in terms of the custody and related matters, all

6

that I had decided, and (inaudible) covers all of it.

That incorporates, I suppose, all that was

7

MR. BLONQUIST: It does, yes.

8

THE COURT: Mr. Blonquist, I think I'll look to you to

9

do t h a t .

10

MR. BLONQUIST: I w i l l do

11

THE COURT: W e ' l l b e i n

12

MS. LEMS: Thank y o u .

13

(Hearing concluded)

it.

recess.
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[1909 S Washington Ave , Provo, UT 84606I

ADDENDUM "D

JAMES LEWIS KIMBALL
V.

MINUTE ENTRY
Case No. 024901659
Judge Fratto

MERAE KIMBALL
The matter is before the court to consider a series of post-trial motions. For the reasons
given, these motions are denied.

Petitioner's Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside Amended Decree and Findings of Fact
And Conclusions of Law
With this motion, petitioner objects to certain written findings as contrary to the court's
in-court declarations. Respondent's argument that use of Rule 60(b) to raise petitioner's
objections is well taken. Nevertheless, the court's has substantively reviewed the objections and,
although expressqd with different terminologyfromthat used in court, the amended findings
submitted by respondent correctly capture the court'sfindings.Specifically, the court found that
petitioner altered checks obtainedfromrespondent without her permission. The term "forgery"
correctly characterizes this activity.

Respondent's Motion to Amend Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
and Amended Decree of Divorce
With this motion, respondent urges the court to reconsider the determination that
petitioner used proceeds obtained through forgery for "family purposes," and that respondent is in

un n

contempt of court. The argument is that the evidence does not support the findings and the
determination thereon when the correct standards and burden of proof are applied.
It is petitioner's burden to show that he used the proceeds from forgery for family
purposes. The court may consider his testimony and give it the weight and credibility it deserves.
The reasonable inferences that are drawn from all the evidence may be considered; the dearth of
evidence to the contrary weighed. There may be differing views of the evidence, the credibiUty of
the witness' and the inferences that may be reasonably drawn therefrom, but the court is not
convinced that it either used an incorrect standard of proof or erred as to the evidence to be
applied to that standard.

Respondent's Motion for Sanctions Under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure
With this motion, respondent requests sanctions for having to respond to petitioner's
motion to extend the time to file a memorandum. Petitioner's request was considered by the court
as properly made ex parte; no response from respondent was anticipated. The extension was
granted.
Although the timeliness of petitioner's request may be questioned, sanctions pursuant to
Rule 11 are not appropriate because the court has not been intentionally misled or the request
made for an improper purpose.

Respondent's Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions
With this motion, respondent requests sanctions against petitioner because of

2

tLfir//st

misrepresentations in their Rule 60(b) motion. There was evidence that petitioner had applied for
credit in connection with an auto sale and inflated his income on the application. Whether
petitioner intended to inflate his monthly or yearly income is unclear and open to different views
of the evidence on that point. Consequently, petitioner's representations about the evidence that
take one view to the exclusion of the other is appropriate. There does not appear to be an
intention to mislead or misrepresent.

Respondent's Motion to Strike (Affidavit of Michelle Burk)
This motion begs the question: Can the court consider a transcript of court proceedings
not produced by an "official court transcriber," as defined by Rule 3-305 Rules ofJudicial
Administration?
The rule is silent on this question, and there does not otherwise appear to be a prohibition
on the trial court's consideration of an unofficial transcript. There was no misrepresentation of
die transcribers status, and no allegation that the transcript that was produced had material errors.

This minute entry constitutes the order regarding the matters addressed herein. No further
order is required.
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ADDENDUM "E

FBLED BJSTR1CT V « » " B
Third Judicial District
MAR j 0 2005

Christopher J. Rogers, #10104
LEMS LAW OFFICE, P.C.
7050 South Union Park Center, Suite 350
Salt Lake City, Utah 84047
Telephone (801)256-9500
Facsimile (801) 255-2442
Attorneys for Petitioner
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JAMES LEWIS KIMBALL,
Petitioner,
vs.

ORDER RE: CUSTODY AND RELATED
MATTERS
Civil No: 024901659 DA

MERAE KIMBALL,

Judge Joseph C. Fratto
Commissioner Susan C. Bradford
Respondent

Trial having been scheduled in the above-entitled matter from November 29, 2004,
through December 8, 2004, and based upon partial stipulation of the parties entered on the record
at time of trial scheduled on November 30, 2004, before the Honorable Judge Joseph C. Fratto,
Jr.; Petitioner* James Kimball along with his counsel of record, Wendy J. Lems and Christopher
Rogers of Lems Law Office, P.C. being present; Respondent, Merae Kimball being present with
her counsel of record, Thomas R. Blonquist; and Guardian Ad Litem, Robert Steele being
present as and for the minor children, the Court having heard and accepted the partial stipulation

of the parties regarding custody of the minor children and related matters thereto; having
considered the pleadings on file, and for good cause shown, does hereby enter the following:
IT IS HEREBY FOUND AND ORDERED:
1. Custody:
a. The Court does hereby find that it is in the best interests of the minor children that
the parties will share equally in the joint legal and joint physical custody of the
children, to-wit: Amanda, Daniel, and Ryker Kimball shall be under the primary
physical custody of Respondent, with Petitioner exercising parent-time pursuant
herein; Brooke Kimball shall be under the primary physical custody of Petitioner,
with Respondent having therapeutic parent-time visitation with Brooke as detailed
herein.
2. Primary Residence of the Children:
a. The primary residence for Amanda, Daniel, and Ryker Kimball is with the
Respondent, Merae Kimball.
b. The primary residence for Brooke Kimball is with the Petitioner, James Kimball.
3. Parent-Time Planning Meeting and Parent-Coordinator:
a. On a monthly basis, the parties shall meet with parent-coordinator, Dr. Jill
Sanders, to discuss parent-time for the parties (hereinafter "Parent-Time Planning
Meeting"). As part of the parties' Parent-Time Planning Meetings, the parties
under the direction of Dr. Jill Sanders shall plan their respective parent-time with
the minor children in advance for at least sixty (60) days. At the direction of Dr.

oaiiucis or as may be reasonably necessaiy, the parties may be required to meet
more or less often than a monthly basis for their respective parent-time meetings
with Dr. Sanders.
b. At the Parent-Time Planning Meetings, Dr. Sanders shall discuss the parent-time
with the parties, assist the parties in planning the parent-time schedule, make
suggestions concerning the same, including but not limited to the scheduling of
extra curricular activities, events, holidays, summertime parent-time, vacations, or
trips. Dr. Sanders shall also suggest therapist(s) for any of the minor children,
suggest therapy or other parenting classes for any party, make suggestions
concerning any and all child care, suggest any modifications concerning parenttime, and shall be able to write correspondence to the Court provided Dr. Sanders
submits copy of the correspondence to all counsel in this matter.
c. Dr. Jill Sanders shall have "dual" roles as: (1) the family therapist and (2) the
parent-coordinator. Further, Lisa Jones-Reading shall continue as the "Special
Master" in this matter. The parties agree that two separate orders shall be
prepared, drafted and entered for Dr. Jill Sanders and Lisa Jones-Reading
concerning their respective powers and responsibilities in this matter.
d. The parties will follow any and all suggestions and recommendations of the
parent coordinator, Jill Sanders subject to the appeal process as described herein.
e. Dr. Jill Sanders has a very broad role as described herein and as more fully
memorialized in Order of Parent Coordinator, to be filed herewith. However, the
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the minor children as set forth herein.
4. Appeal Process:
a. In the event of impasse or disagreement between the parties pursuant to the
Parent-Time Planning Meeting, any party may submit the issue to Special Master
Lisa Jones-Reading for decision. Within a reasonable period of time, the Special
Master shall issue her decision to the parties. The decision of the Special Master
shall be effective when issued whether in writing or orally.
b. If either party desires to appeal or otherwise object to the decision of the Special
Master, either party may submit the issue to the Court for decision by filing a
Motion for Order to Show Cause.
5. Extra-Circular Activities and Events:
a. The Parties agree that each child shall be involved in no more than one (1) sport
per season.
b. Music practice and lessons for the children concerning the same shall be ongoing
and shall continue, excluded from the provisions of paragraph 5(a).
c. Both parties may attend any extra-curricular activity or event of any of the
children, if the party so desires.
d. Neither party shall have any contact or communication with the other party,
including direct face-to-face or indirect non-verbal communication.

e

Durin 0 the extra-curricular sctivit~r or even** the children shall have ability to
freely contact or communicate with any parent The parties shall not discourage
the children from contacting or communicating with the other parent at extracurricular activities or events.

f.

For any and all extra-curricular activities and events of the children, whichever
parent is exercising parent-time according to the Parent-Time Planning Meeting
and direction of Dr. Sanders, is responsible for transportation to and from the
extra-curricular activity and/or event.

g. If activities are not scheduled during the Parent-Time Planning Meeting with Dr.
Sanders as identified above, the extra-curricular activity and/or event shall not
occur.
6. Holidays, Vacations and Trips:
a. If either party desires to take any of the children out of the Salt Lake Valley for
one or more overnights, the requesting party shall provide at least thirty (30) day
advance written notice to both the other party and Dr. Jill Sanders. The notice
shall include but not limited to the itinerary, reservation confirmation numbers,
any and all dates and times of arrival and departure, addresses and phone numbers
where the children can be reached.
b. Any and all trips or vacations shall be planned in conjunction with the ParentTime Planning Meeting and Dr. Sanders. Every effort should be made to plan any
and all trips or vacation on the requesting parents' parent-time.

c.

AII W

siid all holidays "iirsuaiji to
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AN7\. £ 30-3-35. attached hereto as

Exhibit " 1 , " shall take precedence over the parent-time schedule of either party,
unless directed otherwise by Dr. Sanders.
d. The parties' respective Summer time, extended or otherwise parent-time with the
children will be addressed and coordinated with the parent coordinator, Dr. Jill
Sanders. *
7. Parent-Time:
a. Petitioner shall be entitled, at least as a default provision, to a specific parent-time
schedule with children Amanda, Daniel, and Ryker Kimball. This schedule may
be modified during the Parent-Time Planning Meeting by Dr. Jill Sanders.
b. Petitioner monthly parent-time schedule for Amanda, Daniel, and Ryker Kimball
shall be as follows:
i. For the first week of each month, Petitioner shall have overnight weekend
parent-time visitation from Friday at 7:00pm to Sunday at 7:00pm.
ii. For the second week of each month, Petitioner shall have mid week
visitation every Thursday from 5:30pm to 9:00pm.
iii. For the third week of each month, Petitioner shall have overnight weekend
parent-time from Friday at 6:00pm to Monday morning in which
Petitioner shall take/facilitate the children's attendance at school, if in
session. If school is not in session, the Petitioner shall facilitate the return
of the children to the Respondent by 9:00 a.m.

fs

I

I

time from 5:30pm to 9:00pm.
c. With respect to Amanda Kimball, Petitioner agrees to be flexible in his
scheduling and exercise of parent-time as Amanda Kimball is entering her
teenage years.
d. All parent-time, whether holiday or non-holiday, is subject to change or
modification by the parent-coordinator, Dr. Jill Sanders.
e. Petitioner, James Kimball, shall provide transportation for any of the children
during the exercise of Petitioner's parent-time.
8. School:
a. The parties' minor children, Daniel Kimball and Ryker Kimball, shall remain in
their current school and shall not be transferred to Oakridge Elementary.
9- Brooke Kimball:
a. Brooke Kimball shall continue therapy with Dr. Patiicia Hopps, as needed or
suggested by Dr. Sanders and/or Dr. Hopps. The purpose of therapy between
Brooke Kimball and Dr. Hopps is to facilitate relationship and therapeutic parenttime visitation between Brooke Kimball and Respondent, Merae Kimball.
b. Petitioner agrees to provide, within a reasonable period of time, the use of an
automobile and cellular phone for Brooke Kimball. As a result, the parties agree
that Brooke Kimball may use the automobile and/or cellular phone to freely, at

7

1 /
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the discretion of Bi coke Kimball to corit^ct communicate or visit sir- of the
parties at any time.
10. Disparaging:
a. Neither party shall disparage and/or slander the other party, or allow or permit
other parties in their direct control to do the same, in the presence of any of the
minor children.
b. Neither party shall allow or permit any third parties in their direct control to
disparage and/or slander either party in the presence of any of the minor children.
11. Therapy:
a. The parent coordinator, Dr. Jill Sanders can recommend and suggest additional,
alternate or modified therapy as and for any of the minor children, and the
parents. The parties will reasonably and timely cooperate in any and all
suggestions of the parent coordinator for the same.
12. Reserved Issues:
a. The issue of the costs of Special Master are reserved, if no settlement of the same.
b. The issue of costs concerning the custody evaluator, court-appointed evaluation,
including the costs for any and all experts from both parties concerning the
custody portion of this matter are hereby reserved.
c. The issue of child support is reserved, if no settlement of the same.
13. The parties will pay one-half (1/2) each of any and all costs associated with Parent
Coordinator, Dr. Jill Sanders in a timely and reasonable manner.

8
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NOTICE PURSUANT TO RULE 7
OF UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
TO THE RESPONDENT AND HER COUNSEL, THOMAS R. BLONQUIST:
Notice is hereby given that pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, that
this Proposed Order prepared by the Petitioner shall be the Order of the Court unless you file an
objection in writing within five (5) days from the date of the service of this notice.

ADDENDUM "F"
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Wendy J. Lems, #7409
LEMS LAW OFFICE, P.C.
7050 South Union Park Center, Suite 350
Salt Lake City, Utah 84047
Telephone (801) 256-9500
Facsimile (801) 255-2442
Attorneys for Petitioner
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JAMES LEWIS KIMBALL,
Petitioner,
vs.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RULE
60(B) MOTION TO SET ASIDE
AMENDED DECREE OF DIVORCE AND
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

MfiRAE KIMBALL,
Civil No: 024901659 DA
Respondent.
Judge Joseph C. Fratto
Commissioner Susan C. Bradford

COMES NOW Petitioner, James Kimball, by and through counsel of record, Wendy J.
Lems of Lems Law Office, P.C, respectfully submits this Memorandum in Support of
Petitioner's Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside Amended Decree of Divorce and Amended Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered in this matter on September 21,2005, based upon the
ruling of the Honorable Judge Joseph C. Fratto at divorce hearing held May 24,2005. The
Petitioner respectfully requests that certain provisions of the Amended Decree of Divorce and
Findings of Fact and Conclusions thereon as signed by the Court on September 19,2005, and as
entered on September 21, 2005, be set aside, as such orders do not accurately reflect Judge

Fratto's Findings and Orders as made at the time of hearing on May 24, 2005. Rule 60(b)
provides that a Court may upon motion reverse thefinalityof a judgment or order for reasons
including mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; fraud, misrepresentation or other
misconduct of an adverse party; or any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment.
FACTS
1. The Court held trial in the above-entitled matter on November 30,2004, December, 2, 3, 6,
7, 8, 10 and 14, 2004, and April 12 and 13, 2005. The Court took the matter under
advisement and issued Rulingfromthe bench on May 24, 2005. At the time of such Ruling,
the Court directed counsel for the Respondent to submit a proposed Decree of Divorce and
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Counsel for the Respondent on
September 19, 2005 submitted proposed "Amended Decree of Divorce" and proposed
"Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" to the Court without the Petitioner's counsel's
approval to form, and the Court entered the same on September 21,2005.
2. On or about September 29,2005, Respondent, by and through counsel, submitted a second
set of orders as entitled "Motion to Amend Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Amended Decree of Divorce.*' Such documents were not titled properly as "Second
Amended Decree of Divorce" and "Second Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law." Additionally, the mailing certificate to the Respondent's counsel is dated September
29, 2005; however the post-mark for such mailing to counsel for the Petitioner is dated
October 3,2005.

2

ARGUMENT
The Petitioner hereby requests that this Court set aside the Amended Decree of Divorce
and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered on September 21, 2005 pursuant to Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b) as such orders do not accurately reflect Judge Fratto's Findings
and Orders as made at the time of hearing on May 24, 2005. Rule 60(b) provides that a Court
may upon motion reverse the finality of a judgment or order for reasons including: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) fraud,
misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the
judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; or (6) any other reason justifying relief
from the operation of the judgment. Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court has held that a Utah
Court may "vacate, set aside, or modify its orders or judgments entered by mistake or
inadvertences which do not accurately reflect the result of its judgment" and that "the authority
of a court to cause its proceedings and its judgments and orders to be correctly set forth in its
records is necessarily inherent in its powers for the purpose of administering justice." Meagher v.
Equity Oil Co., 299 P.2d 827, 830 (Utah, 1956). The provisions of the Amended Decree of
Divorce and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which do not accurately reflect the
Court's ruling of May 24,2005, should be set aside pursuant to Rule 60{b)(l)(3) and (6). Such
provisions are as follows:
I.

ALLEGED UNAUTHORIZED CHECKS
Paragraph 7 of the Amended Decree of Divorce and corresponding paragraph 9 in the

Conclusions of Law do not accurately reflect the order of this Court. The Amended Decree of

Divorce reads, "Petitioner shall not be punished . . . for . . . forging Respondent's name... and
altering the amount of checks written." Emphasis added. The Court made no such finding. In
fact, the Honorable Judge Fratto said that contrary tofindinga preponderance that the Petitioner
took money to use solely for his benefit, "I found otherwise in terms of the evidence that was
presented in front of me, and I'm not drawing the interferences that [the Respondent is]
suggesting from the evidence." (See Transcript of Court's Ruling of May 24, 2005, attached
hereto as Exhibit "1," page 3, lines 113 through 115.) Judge Fratto specifically declined to
accept the Respondent's "invitation to award all the equity in the Village Point home to her
because of the Petitioner's altering of the checks" because such ruling would be a penalty upon
the Petitioner. The Judge refused to impose such penalty, finding that the money was used for
the family's benefit. (Exhibit 1, page 3, lines 110 through 121. See also Exhibit "1," page 2,
lines 79-90).
Therefore, paragraph 7 of the Amended Decree should be set aside and modified omitting
the term "forging" therefrom and corresponding paragraph 9 of the Conclusions of Law should
also be set aside and modified to remove such terminology which was not found or used by the
above-entitled Court at the time of the Court's Ruling on May 24,2005.
II.

FINDINGS OF FACT NUMBER 5
Based on the reasoning above and the Court's findings, the Court also considered at time

of trial Petitioner's allegations of "co-mingling" of the stock purchase agreement monies, (as
identified by Respondent, as "shares of the family business") in the Amended Decree of Divorce.

Therefore, paragraph 5 of the Findings of Fact should address not only claims of "inheritance
and enhancement" but also "co-mingling."
Additionally, nowhere in the Findings of Fact did it identify that the Respondent acquired
on or about 1976, prior to the parties' marriage, approximately 1005 shares of stock in Utah
Bearing and Fabrication, Inc. (hereafter, "Utah Bearing"). Additionally, nowhere in the Findings
of Fact does it identify that on or about 1994, dispute ensued between Respondent and Utah
Bearing concerning the value of Respondent's stock and the potential purchase of Respondent's
stock from Utah Bearing.
Furthermore, nowhere in the Findings of Fact does it identify the findings and evidence
presented to the Court at time of trial as follows:
a.

At the time of the parties' marriage, the Petitioner was employed at Jorgensen

Appraisal and Respondent was employed as a teacher for Granite School District.
b.

On or about February 1988, Petitioner was employed with Utah Bearing,

Respondent's father's family business.
c.

On or about June 1990, Petitioner began work for Cate Equipment, also known or

other subsidiary of Utah Bearing, Respondent's father's family business. At about this same
time, Respondent quit her job at Granite School District.
d.

The parties' relationship deteriorated and Petitioner and Respondent separated on

or about late February, 2002 or early March, 2002.
e.

After the death of Respondent's father, Frank Pardoe on August 9,1993, Frank

Pardoe had a will that left everything via a residuary clause, including all of Mr. Pardoe's stock

interest that he possessed, to the James Franklin Pardoe Trust. Respondent, Merae Kimball, then
Merae Pardoe, was one of the beneficiaries to the trust along with Respondent's mother and
other siblings.
f.

On or about November 1993, Frank Pardoe's heirs including Respondent,

specifically agreed to alter the terms of the Will to have all testamentary devises and bequests in
the Will go outright to Respondent's mother, Cherie Pardoe, instead of to the Trust as specified
in the residuary clause of the Will.
g.

On or about November 1,1993, approximately three (3) months after Frank

Pardoe died, Respondent received stock from resolution of the Board of Directors of Utah
Bearing canceling all previously issued shares of the Corporation and issued new 1005 Class A
voting stock to Respondent, during her marriage to the Petitioner.
h.

On or about 1994, Respondent received an initial offer from Derek Pardoe,

Respondent's brother and former President of Utah Bearing, for purchase of Respondent's 1005
stock shares in an approximate amount of $1,700,000.00.
i.

Thereafter, after discussions between the parties, Petitioner and Respondent, and

in discussions and advise with family friend, Robert Rice and Petitioner's uncle, Kay Lewis,
Respondent was referred to attorney Thomas KLC/Kelch.
j.

On March 24,1995, Respondent sold her 1005 shares of stock in Utah Bearing

pursuant to Stock Purchase Agreement dated March 24,1995, for $2,500,000.00.
k.

On or about March 24,1995, Respondent received the five hundred thousand

dollars ($500,000.00) down payment from the Stock Purchase Agreement.
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On or about March 24,1995, shortly after Respondent received the five hundred

thousand dollars ($500,000.00) down payment from the Stock Purchase Agreement, Respondent
deposited the entire $500,000.00 down payment into the parties' joint money market account at
Zions Bank.
m.

From March 24,1995, to July 1, 1997, the parties received monthly payments in

the amount of twenty-five thousand three hundred thirty-five dollars and fifteen cents
($25,335.15) pursuant to the Stock Purchase Agreement of March 24, 1995. These monthly
payments were deposited into several of the parties' accounts including but not limited to the
parties' joint Zions Bank account, the parties' joint Bank One account and the parties' Fidelity
account.
n.

On or about July 1, 1997, Utah Bearing decided to pay off the remaining principle

balance owed to Respondent under the Stock Purchase Agreement. On or about July 1,1997,
Respondent received $1,691,963.99 for the remaining principle balance owed to Respondent
under the Stock Purchase Agreement and the entire amount was deposited in the parties' joint
Bank One account. Based on the above, the parties incurred tax debt on the Stock Purchase
Agreement settlement proceeds. The parties' tax obligation, on their joint tax return on such
proceeds approximated $398,614.00 which the parties' paid on or about 1997 from the Fidelity
account.
o.

During the parties' marriage, the parties deposited, withdrew, and transferred

monies in accounts held with Fidelity Investments, Zion's Bank, Bank One, First Security Bank,

Wells Fargo Bank, and Jay Rice investment accounts for household, family, joint tax obligation
and marital expenses.
p.

Both parties freely signed each others name on checks, which is common practice

among married couples.
WHEREFORE, the above-referenced Findings should be included in the Court's
Findings of Fact and were an integral part of the evidence submitted and found by the aboveentitled Court.
III.

OUTSTANDING DEBT OWED TO COURT APPOINTED EXPERTS, LISA
READING, DR. HAYDEE MAS AND JIM HOTTINGER
In the Amended Decree of Divorce, paragraph 16 and the corresponding paragraphs

contained in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, paragraphs 88, 90, 91, and 92 should
be revised to reflect that "Respondent is ordered to pay the outstanding debt to Lisa Reading,
Esquire and hold the Petitioner harmless therefrom." The Court identified the Court appointed
experts as Lisa Reading, Dr. Haydee Mas and Jim Hottinger which the Court directed the
Respondent to pay any and all costs incurred therewith up until the time of the Court's Ruling of
May 24, 2005, as the Respondent has better financial ability to pay such costs. Hereafter, the
parties will pay one-half (1/2) of such costs as and for the benefit of the children. (See transcript,
Exhibit " 1 , " page 12, lines 522 through 538). Likewise paragraphs 90 and 91 as well as 92 of the
Findings of Fact and paragraph 18 of the Conclusions of Law should be set aside as such
provisions do not accurately reflect the evidence before the Court nor the Court's Ruling thereon.
In regards to paragraph 16 and paragraph 92 of the Amended Decree of Divorce, Respondent
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was ordered to pay the outstanding.debt owed to Lisa Reading up through the date of the Court's
Ruling, May 24, 2005. The actual sum of such debt was not entered into evidence nor provided
by the Respondent. Therefore, the paragraphs as identified should be set aside and the language
modified to correctly reflect the true orders of this Court.
IV.

MONETARY JUDGMENT
Paragraph 18 of the Amended Decree of Divorce and paragraph 19 and paragraph 93 of

the Conclusions of Law award "judgment against the Petitioner in the sum of $5,086.53." Yet
neither the Court's docket of the hearing nor the transcription of the Judge's order awards the
Respondent such sum of money. It appears that the Respondent's counsel, in drafting the
Amended Decree of Divorce and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, has awarded his
client monies not authorized to her as reimbursement for her payments to Court-appointed
experts. In reality, the Judge ordered that the Respondent, not the Petitioner, pay all the expert
"fees up to this point, and then hereafter it is to be divided in half.... In terms of the Custody
Evaluator... I think it appropriate that the fees be divided in half." (Exhibit 1, page 12, lines
533 through 537.) [Therefore, fees incurred up until the date of the hearing, May 24,2005, are
to be paid by the Respondent, but future fees are to be split by the parties.] However, the cost of
the Custody Evaluator, Dr. Matthew Davies, who according to the Court's Findings of Fact is to
be equally divided by the parties.
The Respondent, however, is asking for $5,086.53, an amount reflecting half of the
outstanding balance owed to the Special Master plus half of the difference in amounts which
allegedly, the Respondent and the Petitioner have paid for the fees owed to Court-appointed
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professionals. The Respondent's counsel misrepresents the Judge's actual order on May 24,
2005. In paragraph 93 of Findings of Facts, counsel for Respondent writes "Based upon the
disproportionate payments made by the parties to Court ordered professionals, it is reasonable
that the Petitioner pay the Respondent $5,086.53." Yet the Court explicitly ordered a
disproportionate payment because the Respondent "has the assets to be able to do that." (Exhibit
1, page 13, line 558.) The Amended Decree of Divorce should have reflected the Judge's order
and should read, "The Respondent is to pay any and all outstanding debts owed to Courtappointed experts from the date of trial to today's date, with the exception of the Custody
Evaluator whose fee is to be split by the parties. All expenses incurred hereafter are to be split
by the parties." Such phrasing would accurately represent Judge Fratto's order.
V.

ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS
Paragraph 24 of the Amended Decree of Divorce and Paragraph 26 of the Conclusions of

Law do not accurately represent the complete order of this Court. The Amended Decree of
Divorce reads "Petitioner is not entitled to receive compensation from the Respondent in the
form of attorney's fees and costs." Judge Fratto in his order addressed the request of attorney's
fees and costs by both parties and explained why he denied such request by both parties.
(Exhibit 1, pages 5 and 6, lines 225 through 261.) The Respondent's counsel's inclusion in the
Amended Decree of Divorce only denial of fees and costs to the Petitioner indicates that the
Judge considered only a request from Petitioner, when in fact both parties were denied such
request. The Order should reflect the Judge's full consideration on the matter. The Amended
Decree of Divorce and the Conclusions of Law should reflect that neither party is entitled to
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receive attorney's fees and costs from the other party as follows, "Neither the Respondent nor the
Petitioner has proven the need to be awarded attorney's fees and costs. Further, since Petitioner
did not prevail on financial issues and therefore is not entitled to an award of his attorney's fees.
Paragraph 104 through paragraph 107 of the Findings of Fact should be modified in this
matter to truly reflect the Court's Findings and Ruling as entered at the time of hearing held May
24,2005. Specifically such paragraphs should be omitted and revised as follows: "The Court
does hereby find that it has discretion in an award of attorney's fees and costs. The Court will
not award fees or costs as a penalty that either party should pay. However, if the Court is to
award fees, the Court must base the same on financial need, ability to pay and the reasonableness
of requested fees. After reviewing the Petitioner's request for fees, the Court does hereby find
that the Petitioner has not prevailed. The Court further finds that it is not convinced that all fees
incurred by the Petitioner were reasonable or necessary as requested in the sum of $250,000.00.
The Court has reviewed the accountings provided and cannot discern one particular entry or
group of entries to identify what fees if any may not be reasonable or not necessary. The Court
does hereby find however that the amount of $250,000.00 in attorney's fees represents that the
case got out of hand and is not reasonable. Further, in reviewing the Petitioner's request for fees
it appears that the fees requested that were connected to the child custody and related matters
have been paid by the Petitioner's family. Based on the same, the Court does not find a financial
need to reimburse the Petitioner and the Court is not convinced that Petitioner is legally bound to
pay back those fees as those fees have in large part been paid already by his parents. After
reviewing the Respondent's request, the Court does hereby find that the Respondent has
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considerable assets which the Court needs to take into account based on her need. In any event,
the Court finds that the Petitioner has no ability to pay any portion of the Respondent's fees.
Therefore, the Court finds that both parties will pay their own attorney's fees." (See transcript of
proceedings, Exhibit u l , " pages 5 and 6, lines 225 through 261).
WHEREFORE, Petitioner respectfully requests that paragraph 24 of the Amended
Decree of Divorce as well as paragraph 26 of the Conclusions of Law be modified and the
language of the Court as identified above, be adopted by this Court pursuant to the Court's
Ruling of May 24, 2005.
VI.

FORGED/FORGERY
The Respondent's proposed Findings as contained in paragraphs 33, 39 and 72, are not

consistent with the Court's orders. Pursuant to the Ruling of the Court at hearing held May 24,
2005, the Court specifically found that "Petitioner, without authorization, signed the
Respondent's name to checks, without authorization, altered the amount on certain checks. The
Court further found that pursuant to a preponderance of the evidence, that the money so obtained
was used for family purposes and that the only evidence before the Court was Mr. Kimball's
testimony that the funds were used for family purposes, including all members of the family and
Mr. Kimball." (See transcript, page 2, lines 79 through 87). Therefore, the Court's Findings and
Conclusions of Law should be modified to reflect the true representation and findings of this
Court. At no time did this Court find that the Petitioner had "forged" any checks.
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LORI KAY HOME
As proposed by the Respondent in the Findings of Fact, paragraph 41, 42, and 46 was not

found by the Court and should therefore be stricken. The Court addressed the Lori Kay Home in
its Ruling of May 24, 2005, as found at transcript, page 2, lines 62 through 77; and page 8, lines
332 through 337 and nowhere in the Court's Ruling or Findings therefore, does the Court find as
referenced by the Respondent in the Findings number 41, 42 or 46. Therefore, such added
Findings which do not correctly reflect the Rulings of this Court nor the evidence presented at
time of trial, should be stricken.
Additionally, paragraph 58 of the Findings of Fact should include the language "because
purchased for the family." (See transcript, page 8, lines 332 through 337).
Lastly, the Court ordered that if there were any taxes related to the Lori Kay property,
specifically property taxes, during the pendency of the sale of the Lori Kay lot, that both parties
were to equally pay any taxes owed. (See transcript, page 8, lines 332 through 343).
Therefore, such provisions should be added to the proposed Findings of Fact to truly
reflect the Court's May 24, 2005 Ruling.
VHL CREDIT APPLICATION
Respondent has inserted paragraph 37 alleging Petitioner's credit application referenced
$60,000.00 "per month." The Court in its Findings of May 24, 2005, did not address such credit
application in any manner, nor is such Finding necessary nor a true reflection of the evidence
presented. At time of trial, Petitioner testified that the "per month" reference on his credit
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application meant "per year" and such was a mere inadvertence. Therefore, paragraph 37 should
either be stricken in its entirety or correctly reflect the testimony provided at time of trial.
IX.

INHERITANCE
Paragraphs 50 and 51 were not found by the Court nor addressed in any manner in the

Court's Ruling of May 24, 2005. Such provisions in the Findings of Fact, do not correctly reflect
the evidence presented at time of trial and therefore, such provisions should be stricken.
X.

TAXES/COLLECTION
At no time during the Court's Ruling of May 24, 2005, did the Court find the Findings of

Fact as identified in paragraphs 60 through 65 of the Findings of Fact as proposed by the
Respondent. Further, evidence speaks for itself and any of the tax returns filed by either party
and admitted into evidence, correctly reflect their adjusted gross income and the reporting of any
income earned, whether from Fidelity accounts or otherwise. Therefore, paragraph 60 through
65 regarding the Petitioner's reported income, interest earnings, or collection actions, is not a
true reflection of the evidence presented in the trial in this matter nor did the Court make Ruling
regarding the same at the time of the May 24, 2005 hearing. Therefore such provisions should
be stricken.
XI.

FIDELITY ACCOUNT
Paragraph 66 of the Findings contains mistake in the amount remaining in the

Respondent's Fidelity account. The amount as identified in the exhibits presented and admitted
by the Court was $1,050,603.63. Therefore paragraph 66 should be amended to accurately
reflect the amount in the Fidelity account at the time of the parties' separation.
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Additionally, paragraph 73 through paragraph 77 of the Findings of Fact contains
inaccuracy which was neither found or ruled upon by the Court in any manner and as such,
paragraphs 73 through 77 should be stricken from this Court's orders.
XII.

ALIMONY
Paragraph 83 should be revised to correctly reflect the Court's findings and ruling as

made at the time of the hearing held May 24, 2005, as follows: "The Court does hereby find that
both parties make $2,900.00 per month. Although the Petitioner has had a history of making
more than $2,900.00 a month, at present and based on the evidence presented, Petitioner's gross
monthly income is $2,900.00. The Court does hereby impute income to the Respondent of
$2,900.00 based on the Respondent's having taught school in the past and based on her
testimony of her capability of earning somewhere less than $35,000.00 a year. The Court further
finds that each party has a need of $3,200.00 a month. Evaluating the recipient/Petitioner's need,
the payor's ability to pay and the recipient's ability to support themselves, pursuant to the Jones
v. Jones factors, the Court does hereby find that the Respondent has ability to meet her
reasonable needs and the Petitioner, has ability through employment to meet his reasonable
needs. Therefore, the Court does not award alimony as both parties are able to support
themselves. The Court further finds that the Respondent does not have ability to pay alimony to
the Petitioner." (See transcript, pages 3 and 4, lines 123 through 156).
Therefore, paragraph 83 of the Findings should be revised accordingly to reflect the
Court's Ruling of May 24,2005.

XIII. MISCELLANEOUS
Paragraph 103 of the Findings should be modified to include the language "and comingling of Respondent's inheritance." This omission by the Respondent does not truly and
accurately reflect the trial proceedings before this Court nor the Court's Ruling of May 24, 2005.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, the Petitioner urges this Court to consider the above errors and omissions
in the forms of the Orders prepared and submitted by counsel for Respondent and that the
Amended Decree of Divorce and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law thereon as entered by
this Court on September 21, 2005, be set aside; and that revised and corrected Decree of Divorce
and Findings be entered consistent with this Court's Findings, admitted evidence and the Court's
Ruling or May 24, 2005. Additionally, this Court should award the Petitioner his reasonable
attorney fees and costs for having to file motion for these corrections.
S E DATED THIS ^ O (lay of November, 2005.
LEMS LAW OFFICE, P.C.
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

APR 2:7 2007
SALT LAKE COI

3y.

Thomas R. Blonquist, (0369)
Attorney for Plaintiff
40 South Sixth East
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Telephone: (801) 533-0525
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MERAE KIMBALL,
Plaintiff,

) FINDINGS OF FACT and
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
)

v.
Case No. 030902885
JAMES L. KIMBALL,
Judge Joseph C. Fratto, Jr.
Defendant.
The above entitled matter came on for trial before the Honorable Joseph C. Fratto, Jr.,
District Court judge, sitting without a jury, on August 22nd, 23rd, and 24th, 2006,and February 28th and
March 1st of 2007. The Plaintiff was present represented by her attorney of record, Thomas R.
Blonquist, and the Defendant was present represented by his attorney of record, Wendy J. Lems.
After hearing and considering the testimony from the parties and other witnesses, reviewing and
considering the exhibits received into evidence and considering the statements and arguments of
counsel and otherwise being fully advised in the premises and good cause appearing therefor, the
Court now makes and enters, relative to the Plaintiffs claim of unjust enrichment, the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The parties were married and during the course of the marriage, the Plaintiff came into
a large amount of money, through the sale of stock in her family's business, the "Inheritance
Money" herein.
2. Although the Plaintiff intended to use the Inheritance Money for the benefit of her
family, she both considered and treated it as her sole property.
3. The Plaintiff placed the Inheritance Money with Fidelity Investments in her name with
sole check writing authority.
4. The Defendant was employed during the parties' marriage.
5. For a time, he worked for the Plaintiffs father in sales and held similar subsequent
jobs.
6. It was the Plaintiffs expectation, even though she had a large amount of money, that
the Defendant would continue to support the family through his employment income, leaving the
Inheritance Money for travel, large purchases, and as a blanket of financial security.
7. Among other things, the parties' children were active in tennis and the Plaintiff
approved using the Inheritance Money to finance that activity.
8. Historically, the Defendant had been the sole support of the family and assumed the
day-to-day control and management of the family finances.
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9. Believing that the Defendant was supporting the family through his income, the
Plaintiff took little interest in managing the family finances even after receiving the Inheritance
Money.
10. The Plaintiff neither interfered with, nor participated in the Defendant's active role in
the investment account at Fidelity Investments.
11. There came a time, unbeknown to the Plaintiff, when the Defendant no longer earned
an income through his employment, although he was still expected to financially support the
family.
12. The Defendant began to engage in a pattern of activity, also unbeknown to the
Plaintiff, that included altering, to higher amounts, checks from the Fidelity Investments account
given to him by the Plaintiff and signing the Plaintiffs name to checks, with the Defendant or
"Cash" as the payee.
13. The Defendant does not deny he engaged in this activity, but maintains that he acted
consistent with his role as manager of family finances and that the custom of writing checks and
signing the Plaintiffs name thereto was established during the course of the marriage.
14. The Defendant contends that the altering and signing of the Plaintiffs name occurred
with at least the tacit approval of the Plaintiff.
15. The Defendant further maintains that the proceeds from these checks was used for
unspecified "family expenses" or "family purposes".
16. The Plaintiff intended that her Inheritance Money be kept separate and apart from
joint assets, and that she control its use and disbursement.
3

17. The Defendant was given no authority to alter or sign the Plaintiffs name to Fidelity
checks, although there may have been infrequent, specific instances to the contrary.
18. Such authority is not inherent in managing the family finances and the customs of the
parties'marriage did not establish this precedent.
19. The Defendant's claim that the proceeds from the altered checks or proceeds from
checks made payable to "Jim Kimball" or "Cash" were used to satisfy "family expenses" is not
corroborated by any credible evidence.
20. These checks were negotiated by the Defendant although the bank records do not
show a deposit in the household account as would be expected, if the funds were to be expended
to support the family.
21. The Defendant, without the consent or knowledge of the Plaintiff and without any
right so to do, took the Plaintiffs money by either altering check amounts, as shown by Exhibits
P1-P7, inclusive, or drawing checks with the Defendant or "Cash" as the payee, by the forged
signature of the Plaintiff, as shown by Exhibits P18-P33, excluding P24 and P27, and P41, P45,
andP46.
22. The Defendant has been injustly enriched in that he has taken money in which he was
not entitled.
23. The Defendant's actions constitute theft and forgery and he deceived the Plaintiff into
believing he was working.
24. The Plaintiff relegated administration of the family finances and investments to the
Defendant and she did not participate in their day-to-day management.
4

25. The Defendant took improper advantage of his managerial position and the Plaintiffs
minimal participation and oversight.
26. At least for the altered checks and those made payable to the Defendant or "Cash", the
proceeds were not used to financially support the Defendant's family.
27. These are the circumstances and the "misleading act" that would make it inequitable
for the Defendant to retain proceeds.
28. It is reasonable that the Plaintiff be awarded a judgment against the Defendant in the
sum of $56,800 together with pre-judgment interest on each check from the date thereon, if the
date is visible, to the date of judgment and, thereafter, at the legal rate.
29. Accordingly, it is reasonable that a judgment be awarded based upon the following
checks and pre-judgment interest, from the date shown until April, 20th, the anticipated date of
the judgment:
Prejudgment Interest to April 20th. 2007

Exhibit

Amount

Date

PI

$4,000

Oct. 4, 1999

6.513 x 8.5 years=$2,214.42

P2

$4,000

June 1,1999

6.513 x 8.83 years=$2,300.39

P3

$4,000

April 6, 1999

6.513 x 8 years=$2,084.16

P4

$4,000

Jan. 12, 2000

7.67 x 7.25 years=$2,224.30

P5

$4,000

Jan. 29, 2000

7.67 x 7.25 years=$2,224.30

P6

$4,000

Mar. 27,2000

7.67 x 7.083 years=$2,173.06
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P7

$4,000

Aug. 12,2000

7.67 x 6.667 years=$2,045.44

P18

$3,000

Mar. 8,2000

7.67 x 7.083 years=$ 1,629.79

P19

$3,000

May 2, 2000

7.67 x 6.92 years=$ 1,592.29

P20

$2,000

May 10,2000

7.67 x 6.92 years=$ 1,061.53

P21 "

$3,000

June 26, 2000

7.67 x 6.83 years-$l,571.58

P22

$2,000

July, 18, 2000

7.67 x 6.75 years=$l,035.45

P23

$2,000

July 29,2000

7.67 x 6.75 years=$l,035.45

P24

$1,399

Aug. 1,2000

7.67 x 6.667 years=$715.39

P25

$2,000

Aug. 28, 2000

7.67 x 6.667 years=$ 1,022.71

P26

$2,000

Sept. 7,2000

7.67 x 6.583 years=$ 1,009.83

P27

$1,000

Sept. 27,2000

7.67 x 6.583 years=$504.92

P28

$3,000

Sept. 27,2000

7.67 x 6.583 years=$ 1,514.75

P29

$2,000

Oct. 11,2000

7.67 x 6.5 years=$997.1

P30

$2,000

Nov. 8,2000

7.67 x 6.416 years=$984.21

P31

$2,000

Nov. 13,2000

7.67 x 6.416 years=$984.21

P32

$2,000

Nov. 22, 2000

7.67 x 6.416 years=$984.21

P33

$2,000

Nov. 30, 2000

7.67 x 6.416 years=$984.21

P41

$1,800

Oct. 26,2001

7.34 x 5.416 years=$715.56

P45

$1,000

Dec. 19,2001

7.34 x 5.334 years=$391.52

'
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P46

$1,000

Dec. 31,2001

7.34 x 5.334 years=$391.52

30. Based upon the foregoing, it is reasonable that judgment be entered for pre-judgment
interest in the sum of $34,392.30.
From the foregoing findings of fact, the Court now makes and enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Plaintiffs claim for unjust enrichment should be granted.
2. The evidence supports the three required elements of an unjust enrichment claim,
which are:
A. The Defendant received a benefit from altering and forging the Plaintiffs
checks.
B. The Defendant had knowledge of the benefit he received.
C. The Defendant committed misleading acts that would make it inequitable for
him to retain the proceeds that he received from altering and forging the Plaintiffs checks.
3. The Plaintiff is entitled to a $56,800 judgment against the Defendant, pre-judgment
X
X
X
X
X
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interest from the date of each check, if visible, and post-judgment interest at the legal rate.

DATED this

Zkay of April, 2007.
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

APR 2,7 2007
030902885

SALT LAK5 COUfC

JD21314170
KIMBALL,J AMES L

Thomas R. Blonquist, (0369)
Attorney for Plaintiff
40 South Sixth East
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Telephone: (801) 533-0525

3y.

ENTERED IN REGISTRY
OF JUDGMENTS
DATE

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MERAE KIMBALL,

) JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,

v.
Case No. 030902885
JAMES L. KIMBALL,
Judge Joseph C. Fratto, Jr.
Defendant.

]

In this action, a bench trial was held and thereafter the court entered its findings of fact and
conclusions of law, now, based thereupon, judgment is hereby entered against James L. Kimball, the
above named Defendant.
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the law, and by reason of the premises aforesaid,
IT IS ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Plaintiff, Merae Kimball, recover
from the Defendant, James L. Kimball, the sum offifty-sixthousand eight hundred dollars ($56,800)
together with pre-judgment interest of thirty-four thousand three hundred ninety-two dollars and
thirty cents ($34,392.30) and with said Plaintiffs costs in this action amounting to the sum of one

hundred sixty dollars ($160), for a total judgment of ninety-one thousand three hundred fifty-two
dollars and thirty cents ($91,352.30), with interest thereon at the rate of 6.99% per annumfromthe
date hereof until paid.
Judgment rendered thisO ^day of April, 2007.
Attest my hand as Clerk and the seal of the said Court this

2

day of April, 2007.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MERAE KIMBALL,

AMENDED JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,

v.
Case No. 030902885
JAMES L. KIMBALL,
Judge Joseph C. Fratto, Jr.

Defendant.

In this action, a bench trial was held and thereafter the court entered its findings of fact and
conclusions of law and a judgment. The Defendant filed a timely motion to alter or amend the
judgment and the Court heard and considered arguments thereupon on August 6th, 2007. Following
the hearing, the matter was taken under advisement and the Court, on August 20th, 2007 entered its
memorandum decision denying the Defendant's motion with the exception of excluding the
Plaintiffs Exhibits 45 and 46. Based upon the foregoing, the judgment entered in this cause on
the 26th day of April, 2007 be and the same is amended as follows:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the law, and by reason of the premises aforesaid,

IT IS ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Plaintiff, Merae Kimball, recover
from the Defendant, James L. Kimball, the sum of fifty-four thousand eight hundred dollars
($54,800) together with pre-judgment interest of thirty-three thousand six hundred nine dollars and
twenty-six cents ($33,609.26) and with said Plaintiffs costs in this action amounting to the sum of
one hundred sixty dollars ($160), for a total judgment of eighty-eight thousandfivehundred sixtynine dollars and twenty-six cents ($88,569.26), with interest thereon at the rate of 6.99% per annum
from the date hereof until paid.
Judgment rendered this 1 7 day of September, 2007.
Attest my hand as Clerk and the seal of the said Court this

CLERK
BY THE COURT

faseplr'
(District CofclFudge "">.-* /

day of September, 2007.

The undersigned certifies that on the 31st day of August, 2007, a copy of the foregoing
amended judgment was mailed, postage pre-paid, to Wendy Lems at 7650 South Union Park
Center, Suite #350, Midvale, Utah 84047.
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